When governments run influence operations they may leverage in-house capabilities, outsource to digital mercenaries, or use a combination of these strategies. We theorize that governments outsource because it provides plausible deniability if the operation is uncovered, and offers access to cutting-edge influence tactics beyond those common to established government institutions. Using data from Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, we test implications of this theory via two covert online influence campaign case studies, each focused on Syria, executed by Russia’s military intelligence agency (colloquially known as the GRU), and by the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a privately owned company. We find that the GRU focused on the creation of front media properties that produced longform journalistic content, an established tactic more amenable to reaching general audiences. By contrast, the IRA exploited the architecture of social media platforms to target specific audiences with memes and customized messages that were more narrowly tailored than those spread by the GRU. We also find that the tailored content produced by the IRA received higher engagement than GRU longform articles when posted to the same platforms, even if we include cascades of interactions from re-posts of GRU-authored articles that spread beyond their own Facebook page. Our findings highlight the importance of disaggregating information operations by actor type and across platforms to better understand their tactics and impact.