Governance

FSI's research on the origins, character and consequences of government institutions spans continents and academic disciplines. The institute’s senior fellows and their colleagues across Stanford examine the principles of public administration and implementation. Their work focuses on how maternal health care is delivered in rural China, how public action can create wealth and eliminate poverty, and why U.S. immigration reform keeps stalling. 

FSI’s work includes comparative studies of how institutions help resolve policy and societal issues. Scholars aim to clearly define and make sense of the rule of law, examining how it is invoked and applied around the world. 

FSI researchers also investigate government services – trying to understand and measure how they work, whom they serve and how good they are. They assess energy services aimed at helping the poorest people around the world and explore public opinion on torture policies. The Children in Crisis project addresses how child health interventions interact with political reform. Specific research on governance, organizations and security capitalizes on FSI's longstanding interests and looks at how governance and organizational issues affect a nation’s ability to address security and international cooperation.

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H.R. 1, the For the People Act, is a sweeping bill that aims to strengthen American democracy. Included in the bill are reforms to election administration, campaign finance, gerrymandering, and voting rights. H.R. 1 passed the House in 2019, and is likely to be brought up in Congress again this year.  

What exactly is included in H.R. 1 and what are the arguments of its supporters and detractors? Join us for a deep dive into four components of this historic legislation. Each panel brings together advocates, critics, and academics to describe the specific reforms under consideration.   

These panels are co-sponsored by the Stanford University Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society, and the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project.

 

For more on H.R. 1, please visit our resource page here. 

Slides from the Brennan Center on the For the People Act can be found here.

 

Monday, Feb 1, 12:00 - 1:15 PM (PACIFIC): Election Administration 

H.R. 1 creates federal standards for the administration of elections, eases voter registration rules, expands ballot access through early and mail voting, and strengthens voting system security.  

 

Session Moderators: 

Nate Persily, Co-Director of the Program on Democracy and Internet at Stanford PACS and the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project 
Didi Kuo, Associate Director for Research, Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law at Stanford University  
 

Session Speakers:

Leigh Chapman, Senior Director of Voting Rights Program, The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights 
Nick Penniman, Founder and CEO, Issue One  
Wendy Weiser, Vice President for Democracy, Brennan Center for Justice  
Charles Stewart III, Kenan Sahin Distinguished Professor of Political Science at MIT, Co-Director of the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project 
David Becker, Executive Director and Founder, Center for Election Innovation & Research

 

Tuesday, Feb 2, 12 - 1:15 PM (PACIFIC): Voting Rights

H.R. 1 recommits to the protections of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, restores felony voting rights, creates safeguards against purges of voting rolls, and requires voter-verified paper ballots.

 

Session Moderators: 

Nate Persily, Co-Director of the Program on Democracy and Internet at Stanford PACS and the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project 
Didi Kuo, Associate Director for Research, Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law at Stanford University 

 

Session Speakers:

Dale Ho, Director, ACLU Voting Rights Project  
Myrna Perez, Director, Brennan Center's Voting Rights and Elections Program  
Janai Nelson, Associate Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF)  
Guy-Uriel Charles, Edward and Ellen Schwarzman Professor of Law, Duke Law School


 

Monday, Feb 8, 12 - 1:15 PM (PACIFIC): Gerrymandering

H.R. 1 bans partisan gerrymandering, establishes uniform rules for the drawing of districts, and requires independent redistricting commissions for congressional redistricting.

 

Session Moderators: 

Nate Persily, Co-Director of the Program on Democracy and Internet at Stanford PACS and the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project 
Didi Kuo, Associate Director for Research, Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law at Stanford University 

 

Session Speakers:

Ben Ginsberg, Lecturer, Stanford Law School  
Ruth Greenwood, Co-Director of Voting Rights and Redistricting, Campaign Legal Center 
Michael Li, Senior Counsel, Brennan Center’s Democracy Program  
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School

 

Tuesday, Feb 9, 12 - 1:15 PM (PACIFIC): Campaign Finance

H.R.1 includes several changes related to disclosure of certain campaign finance activities, regulation of on-line campaigning, and enforcement through the Federal Election Commission.

 

Session Moderators: 

Nate Persily, Co-Director of the Program on Democracy and Internet at Stanford PACS and the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project 
Didi Kuo, Associate Director for Research, Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law at Stanford University 

 

Session Speakers: 

Bradley Smith, Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault Professor of Law, Capital University Law School  
Richard Pildes, Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law 
Meredith McGehee, Executive Director, Issue One  
Alex Kaplan, Vice President of Policy & Campaigns, RepresentUs  
Adav Noti, Senior Director, Trial Litigation & Chief of Staff, Campaign Legal Center


 


 

Online, via Zoom:  REGISTER

Panel Discussions
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A new administration and Congress provide a key opportunity to improve US cybersecurity and the governance of digital technologies. Yet the challenges appear daunting: viral disinformation, widespread privacy violations, algorithms biased by race, class and gender, ransomware running rampant, and unprecedented tech company scale and market dominance. Additionally, the US faces a persistent deficit in skilled cybersecurity workers, a lack of diversity in the field, and a public with wildly unequal broadband internet access.  Meanwhile, competition among governance regimes, specifically between the United States, Europe and China, has raised the stakes over whether democracies or authoritarian governments will set the rules for the internet. The policy choices made by the new administration will play a pivotal role in shaping our global future. On February 24 at 10am PST, join Kelly Born and Marietje Schaake of Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center, Michael Daniel of the Aspen Institute’s Cyber Group, and Karen Kornbluh for the German Marshall Fund to discuss cyber policy priorities for the new administration.

 

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marietje.schaake

Marietje Schaake is a non-resident Fellow at Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center and at the Institute for Human-Centered AI. She is a columnist for the Financial Times and serves on a number of not-for-profit Boards as well as the UN's High Level Advisory Body on AI. Between 2009-2019 she served as a Member of European Parliament where she worked on trade-, foreign- and tech policy. She is the author of The Tech Coup.


 

Non-Resident Fellow, Cyber Policy Center
Fellow, Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence
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Karen Kornbluh
Michael Daniel
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Matt Masterson

Matt Masterson is a former non-resident policy fellow with the Stanford Internet Observatory. He served as Senior Cybersecurity Advisor at the Department of Homeland Security, where he focused on election security issues. He previously served as a Commissioner at the Election Assistance Commission from December 2014 until March 2018, including serving as the Commission’s Chairman in 2017-2018. Prior to that, he held staff positions with the Ohio Secretary of State’s office, where he oversaw voting-system certification efforts and helped develop an online voter registration system. Matt holds a law degree from the University of Dayton School of Law and BS and BA degrees from Miami University in Oxford, Ohio.

As part of his Stanford Internet Observatory fellowship, Matt compiled and published an oral history of the 2020 election, "The Guardians of Democracy."

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The incoming Biden-Harris foreign policy team recognizes well that technology now sits at the epicenter of geopolitics: all aspects of government power — military, economic, and normative — increasingly derive from dominance in technology. The new U.S. team also recognizes that the transatlantic alliance should be working together to drive a 21st-century digital agenda that reflects democratic values. Unfortunately, during the Trump administration, the prospect of such cooperation diminished. Instead, the transatlantic rift over technology policy has grown. Disagreements over government surveillance, private sector data collection and sharing, platform content restrictions, digital competition, and protection of fundamental freedoms like privacy and free expression mean that Europe and the United States find themselves increasingly at odds

Just this summer, the EU Court of Justice struck down the Privacy Shield arrangement, negotiated during the Obama-Biden administration to facilitate cross-border data transfers, putting $7 trillion in digital trade at risk. Instead of democratic unity, some European leaders have embraced a concept of “digital sovereignty” (similar to the Chinese concept of “cyber sovereignty”) in the face of a perceived technology cold war between the U.S. and China. .

No doubt, a democratic regulatory framework for digital services is long overdue. This should be a focal point for the new administration.
Eileen Donahoe
Executive Director, GDPi

Ironically, one area of agreement seems to be the threat posed by dominant U.S. technology companies. Last month, the European Union unveiled new regulation that would impose fines of up to 10 percent of revenue on large “gatekeeper” companies -- a euphemism for US “Big Tech” -- that abuse their market power. In the waning days of the Trump administration, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed an anti-trust lawsuit against Facebook and launched an investigation into data collection at nine companies. At a time when Europe and the United States are divided on many tech issues, they have converged on one point: big tech companies are bad for democracies.

No doubt, a democratic regulatory framework for digital services is long overdue. This should be a focal point for the new administration. The heart of that framework should be protection of fundamental rights to privacy, free expression, freedom of assembly and association, as well as transparency and accountability mechanisms that support user’s procedural rights.

But policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic need to be careful not to hit the wrong target. The real threat to democracies isn’t the size or dominance of U.S. tech companies: it’s China’s rapidly spreading model of digital authoritarianism. Rather than focusing primarily on competition within their borders, Europe and the United States need to raise their sights and consider the much more ominous competitive threat posed by Chinese technological dominance.

The global tech race is about far more than market competition – it is a normative battle. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) understands that geopolitical and normative power stem from dominance in digital technologies. It has focused on becoming a global innovation powerhouse through fusion of its civil-military tech R&D and direct support of its tech industry. The immensity of Beijing’s investment in emerging technologies is staggering, with no less than 16 different “Manhattan Project”-scale initiatives in fields as varied as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cryptography, 5G, facial recognition, and genomics.

As China’s tech industry grows, so does its ability to set international norms and standards that reflect authoritarian values and interests. Beijing has deployed ground-breaking technology for repression, most notably against the Uighur minority in Xinjiang, where an unprecedented system of mass surveillance monitors the movement of people, phones, and vehicles to detect inappropriate activity that merits investigation or detention. At the same time, China presumes state control over all data and seeks to normalize its concept of “cyber sovereignty” (a concept uncomfortably close to the EU’s chosen term “digital sovereignty”) which rejects outside scrutiny of its use of technology to violate human rights.

Most concerningly, Beijing’s dominance in technology has translated into greater clout in the international diplomatic realm. Its influence has been visible in tech standard setting bodies like the ITU, where it has sought to embed its preferred protocols in next generation interoperability standards. At the UN Human Rights Council, China succeeded in convincing a majority of countries not to criticize its repressive uses of technology in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.

To combat the rise of China’s model of digital authoritarianism, Europe and the United States cannot focus solely on technology challenges within their own borders. They must overcome their own tech policy divisions and embrace responsibility to develop a democratic digital strategy that attracts global support. The agenda must simultaneously drive innovation and solidify a normative framework for governance of data and technology that protects fundamental rights. In an olive branch to the incoming Biden Administration, the EU proposed to set a joint transatlantic tech agenda. It then turned around to sign a massive trade deal with China. These mixed signals could send us in the wrong direction. The Biden administration should seize the first entrée and set up a process to immediately seek concrete progress on our shared technology interests. To be effective, such an agenda must emphasize three core areas.

First, the U.S. and E.U. must develop a joint plan to protect critical supply chains and invest in emerging technologies. This should include concrete mechanisms for U.S.-EU cooperation on innovation and increased joint investment in emerging technology research.

Second, the plan must articulate a democratic approach to cross-border data protection and a shared framework for governance of digital society consistent with universal human rights principles. A new process could be established to reconcile diverging policies on privacy and free expression, as well as norms on use of data and technology by governments and the private sector.

Third, transatlantic partners must reenergize their international diplomacy and develop a coordinated strategy to combat China’s influence in both tech standards and norm setting bodies. The United States and Europe must attract, and then leverage, the combined power of democratic coalitions at multilateral institutions to push back against China’s encroaching influence. Incorporating technology innovation as part of international development efforts will add to the attraction. 

A shared technology agenda can provide a new underpinning for the transatlantic alliance, on par with collective defense and a commitment to democratic values and principles. Regulation for regulation’s sake will only weaken democracies’ already waning dominance in digital technologies, and with it, our collective ability to set the international normative agenda on everything from artificial intelligence to cloud computing. Digital sovereignty that prevents collaboration is not the way forward. Working together to secure a democratic digital domain should be the ultimate goal. In this effort, U.S. tech companies are not the enemy.

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Eileen Donahoe

Executive Director, Global Digital Policy Incubator
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Top Technology Policy Priorities for the New Administration

Now is the time to rally the world around a democratic vision of digital society.
Top Technology Policy Priorities for the New Administration
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Our EU partners must resist the impulse to digital sovereignty.

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What rules for the web? That question has been given new urgency on January 6th. The European Union, at the end of 2020, proposed the Digital Services Act (DSA). This new legislation aims at creating clarity about the responsibility of tech platforms and intermediaries. European rules, just as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) did, will likely have ripple effects worldwide. Is there room for transatlantic alignment? How do values translate into enforceable rules? Can fundamental rights and economic growth go hand in hand? And who keep the gatekeepers in check? We will dive into the proposed Digital Services Act with leading European experts.

Join Stanford Cyber Policy Center's Marietje Schaake, International Policy Director and former Member of European Parliament in conversation with the CPC’s Daphne Keller, Director of the Center for Internet and Society, Guillermo Beltrà Navarro, European Union’s Digital Policy Lead, Eliška Pírková, Access Now’s Europe Policy Analyst and Joris van Hoboken, Professor of Law at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels.

 

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Daphne Keller is the Director of Platform Regulation at the Stanford Program in Law, Science, & Technology. Her academic, policy, and popular press writing focuses on platform regulation and Internet users'; rights in the U.S., EU, and around the world. Her recent work has focused on platform transparency, data collection for artificial intelligence, interoperability models, and “must-carry” obligations. She has testified before legislatures, courts, and regulatory bodies around the world on topics ranging from the practical realities of content moderation to copyright and data protection. She was previously Associate General Counsel for Google, where she had responsibility for the company’s web search products. She is a graduate of Yale Law School, Brown University, and Head Start.

SHORT PIECES

 

ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

 

POLICY PUBLICATIONS

 

FILINGS

  • U.S. Supreme Court amicus brief on behalf of Francis Fukuyama, NetChoice v. Moody (2024)
  • U.S. Supreme Court amicus brief with ACLU, Gonzalez v. Google (2023)
  • Comment to European Commission on data access under EU Digital Services Act
  • U.S. Senate testimony on platform transparency

 

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Director of Platform Regulation, Stanford Program in Law, Science & Technology (LST)
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marietje.schaake

Marietje Schaake is a non-resident Fellow at Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center and at the Institute for Human-Centered AI. She is a columnist for the Financial Times and serves on a number of not-for-profit Boards as well as the UN's High Level Advisory Body on AI. Between 2009-2019 she served as a Member of European Parliament where she worked on trade-, foreign- and tech policy. She is the author of The Tech Coup.


 

Non-Resident Fellow, Cyber Policy Center
Fellow, Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence
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Guillermo Beltrà Navarro
Joris van Hoboken
Eliška Pírková
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The incoming Biden-Harris administration will face many urgent and competing priorities as it seeks to signal a distinct shift from the Trump presidency. In the technology policy realm alone, there are many challenges to confront. Chief among them is the urgent need to solidify international support for a values-based vision of “the internet” and a compelling democratic approach to governance of digital society.

Solidifying an open democratic vision of digital society will require robust diplomacy in three areas. First, we must rebuild global commitment to an open, interoperable, secure and reliable internet and to international norms in the cyber realm. Second, we must lead the development of a shared understanding of what democratic, human rights-based governance of digital society entails. Third, we must bring our democratic allies together around a shared strategic technology agenda.

As context for these efforts, we must start by acknowledging that the original U.S. vision of a global, open, interoperable, internet has been clouded by two big trends: first, heightened anxiety within democracies about the myriad risks associated with connectivity and digitization, and second, perhaps more importantly, competition from a much darker vision of digital authoritarianism.

The digital transformation of society has brought profound change to every aspect of connected society and dramatically altered the context for democratic governance. “The internet” has become the infrastructure of society, moving well beyond its early core function of facilitating instantaneous global communication. The wide array of advanced technologies that are now intertwined with all sectors of society have created new vulnerabilities for many aspects of public and private life.

While digitization obviously has yielded substantial benefits, democratic governments are struggling to meet their basic obligations to protect the liberty and security of citizens in this radically changed context. Digitization has created security risks for personal data, confidential communications, and connected infrastructure. Democratic governments are now seized with the fact that digital information platforms have been exploited by malign actors to spread propaganda and disinformation, wreaking havoc on democratic elections and eroding trust in the digital information realm. These threats are testing the ability of democratic governments to protect fundamental freedoms like privacy, free expression, freedom of assembly and association and the right to democratic participation in digitized society. At the same time, the malign actors who have capitalized on these vulnerabilities to attack democracy generally have escaped consequences.

All of this is eroding confidence in democratic governance in the digital realm. The sense of radical insecurity has led some democratic governments to undertake security measures or enact regulations that are inconsistent with their human rights commitments, such as unchecked collection of data in violation of privacy or restrictions for online content that undercut free expression. Furthermore, trust between democratic allies has been eroded by competing assessments of what human rights principles and democratic values actually require in the digital context. In particular, a transatlantic rift has emerged over a broad portfolio of digital policy challenges, ranging from cross-border data transfers; unchecked digital surveillance by governments; private sector “surveillance capitalism;” monopoly power of U.S. platforms; and tech regulations that fail to conform with democratic values. These digital policy tensions between democratic allies have had the unintended effect of undermining global confidence in the feasibility of adhering to international human rights norms and democratic values in digitized societies.

While democratic governments have been inwardly focused and preoccupied with their own tensions, a digital-authoritarian model of control through data and technology has gained traction globally. This digital authoritarian model, which rests on a concept of “cyber sovereignty,” now competes with the open democratic vision of the internet and society. Authoritarian governments, most notably China, have become increasingly adept at using digital technology for repressive purposes at home, role-modeling these practices to the world. They also have capitalized on the growing export-market for surveillance and censorship technologies, spreading these capacities for others to follow their repressive lead.

Unfortunately, China’s leadership also recognized earlier than most that dominance in technology brings significant geopolitical, diplomatic and normative influence. Their massive strategic investments in technology already have translated into the ability to embed and spread China’s authoritarian values globally, particularly within tech standard and protocol setting bodies like the International Telecommunications Union. Sadly, China’s digital authoritarian influence has also shown up in more traditional norm setting arenas, such as the UN Human Rights Council, where absurd declarations of support for China’s repressive use of technology in Xinjiang and in Hong Kong have succeeded. Finally, the digital authoritarian concept of “cyber sovereignty,” which is antithetical to a global open interoperable internet and justifies its fragmentation, also serves as support for a more conventional authoritarian stance – rejection of external criticism based on internationally recognized human rights – now applied in the digital realm. 

Democracies must recognize that we are in a geopolitical battle over the governance model that will dominate in the 21st century digital context. This presents an existential threat not just to U.S. economic and national security, but also to our values-based vision for the internet and open democratic digital society. Strong U.S. leadership is needed to develop a compelling democratic conception of digitized society and to rebuild the democratic alliance around a shared strategic technology agenda.

To achieve these aims, the incoming administration should focus on five practical priorities.

First, we must “get our own house in order” by ensuring that U.S. digital technology policy is consistent with human rights and democratic values. The level of attention to the normative dimensions of technology policy, as well as to investment in emerging technology, must adequately reflect its strategic importance to our security.  

Second, the digital policy rift with our transatlantic partners must be healed: without U.S.-EU alignment, other democratic partners will lose confidence that a democratic model for digital society is a realistic goal.

Third, the democratic alliance must be rallied around a shared model for democratic governance of digital society and a strategic technology agenda. This democratic model must incorporate institutional constraints on both public and private sector use of data. It also will require further articulation of how government and technology companies apply and adhere to international human rights law and norms in the digital context.

Fourth, we must compete with the digital authoritarian model of governance and develop a comprehensive strategy to combat it. Robust diplomacy in the international normative arena will be essential, both with respect to technical standards and protocols, and with respect to norms on use of data and technology.

Fifth, the U.S. must reclaim the internet for citizens and humanity by investing in innovation and entrepreneurship in regions that have not been included in the digital revolution, both domestically and internationally. Investment in “E-Government” capacities to provide secure and efficient public services should be uncontroversial, as should investments in digital security tools for citizens, consumers and civil society actors. Expanding access to internet connectivity domestically and abroad should also be an early, uncontroversial priority.

This is a full plate. But early attention to these aspects of the democracy and technology portfolio will pay huge dividends for the Biden-Harris team, the U.S. and the democratic world. 

Recommendations for the Biden-Harris Administration:

I: Recognize the normative dimensions of digital technology policy as a strategic concern distinct from cybersecurity. Ensure coherence between domestic and foreign policy and adherence to international human rights law and norms.

Building a democratic approach to digitized society must start at home. U.S. domestic digital technology policy must not undermine our vision of an open internet or our commitment to core human rights principles. “To get our own house in order,” we need to assess the use and regulation of data and digital technology by the U.S. government, with reference to fundamental rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and other basic liberties. Accordingly, U.S. policies, applications and regulations related to data, digital platforms, artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies must be evaluated for consistency with human rights principles. Furthermore, the strategic importance of technology policy to democracy should be reflected through higher-level coordination across agencies and greater coherence between domestic and foreign policy. The most basic point is that the normative dimensions of technology policy must be seen as a strategic issue and be adequately reflected in both domestic and foreign policy.

The administration should start by strengthening mechanisms for values-based technology policy development and coordination with the USG.

  • The National Security Council must focus on normative and diplomatic challenges in the digital realm, as distinct from more traditional cybersecurity concerns. Three focal points include establishing processes to: 1) resolve tensions with allies over how to apply existing international human rights law in the digital context; 2) develop doctrine related to application of international norms in the cyberspace related to cross-border harms and malign activity; 3) evaluate human rights impacts of U.S. government use of data and technology across agencies, as well as of the impact of domestic digital technology policies on global internet freedom.
     
  • The U.S. profile in international technology-related diplomacy must be raised, potentially by establishing an ambassador-at-large for global digital affairs. The ambassador would elevate U.S. participation in bilateral, multilateral and multistakeholder digital and cyber policy development and in international norm-setting arenas. As a first step, U.S. leadership should be dramatically reinvigorated within the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC), including by seeking to chair the coalition. Robust U.S. diplomacy also is needed at international fora where technology standards and protocols are set, such as the International Telecommunications Union, and in arenas where norms of responsible state behavior in the cyber realm are developed, such as the UN Government Group of Experts. Among the first set of initiatives, the Ambassador could engage the U.S. in the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace.
     
  • The new Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technology Bureau at the Department of State announced on January 7, 2021 should be quickly built  to serve the goals outlined in the Cyber Diplomacy Act. The Bureau should cover the full spectrum of technology policy challenges, including development of international norms for cyberspace, tech standard-setting, human rights-based analysis of government and private sector use of data, democratic export controls on technologies of repression, and democratic regulation of digital platforms. The office should take responsibility for developing more robust export controls for repressive technologies and appropriate democratic institutional constraints with respect to government use of data and technologies. 
     
  • Establish a Department of State unit in Silicon Valley, comparable to the Defense Innovation Unit created by the Department of Defense. Its mandate should include exploration of technology innovations related to more effective use of data and technology in governance and provision of public services, as well as technologies that enhance citizens’ privacy, digital security, digital literacy and civic engagement—innovations that the State Departments could then help diffuse worldwide. The office should also be tasked with engaging on policy development with digital platforms and other technology companies, particularly with respect to private sector responsibilities to respect human rights as outlined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The unit should also lead in multistakeholder digital policy development processes that bring civil society voices into democratic technology policy development.

 

II: Resolve the transatlantic digital policy divide, particularly with respect to cross-border data transfers and digital platform regulation.

Any prospect of building a shared democratic technology agenda will require resolution of current tensions between the U.S. and the EU over technology and data. Without U.S.-EU alignment, other democratic partners will lose confidence that a democratic model for digital society is a realistic goal.

Among the most urgent issues to be address are substantial divisions over cross-border data transfer arrangements, digital surveillance by both governments and the private sector, and regulation of digital platforms consistent with democratic values. These disagreements have already placed $7 trillion in transatlantic digital trade at risk and led some members of the EU toward a vision of digital sovereignty that could undermine any potential for a shared democratic approach to digital society.

The first step in healing the transatlantic digital policy divide must be an early concerted dialogue with the EU on three priority issues:

  • Rapid development of an alternative to the Privacy Shield data arrangement. This agreement, negotiated between the U.S. and Europe during the Obama-Biden administration, was struck down in July 2020 by the EU Court of Justice as inconsistent with fundamental rights. Rectifying this problem will require high level negotiations about adequate institutional constraints on government surveillance and appropriate restraints on data-sharing between government and private sector platforms.
     
  • Agreement on a transparency and accountability regime for digital information platforms applicable to U.S. platforms operating in the EU. This framework should emphasize users’ procedural rights and control of data. Recommendations from the Transatlantic high-level working group Transparency and Accountability Framework can provide a starting place. Instead of content-based regulation that place liability on platforms for user-generated content and put freedom of expression at risk, (as seen in some EU country regulations), transparency and accountability mechanisms enhance democratic oversight in ways that are consistent with free expression principles. In addition, greater platform transparency can help educate users, regulators and researchers about algorithmic information systems and build civic resilience to disinformation.
     
  • A process for resolving conflicting U.S.-EU approaches to fundamental rights in the digital policy realm. This new process should serve as a vehicle for resolving tensions over conflicting interpretations of how to protect substantive human rights, how to apply international process principles of necessity, proportionality, and how to assess government regulation of digital platforms so that they are consistent with human rights.

 

III: Galvanize the democratic alliance around a shared values-based vision of digital society and a comprehensive digital technology agenda.

The U.S. should lead a process of renewal for the democratic alliance that inspires optimism and confidence in the superiority of a democratic approach to governance of digital society, as well as commitment to an open internet.

To start the process, the administration should:

  • Capitalize on the opportunity provided by the Summit for Democracy by bringing concerted focus to challenges related to democratic governance of digital society and the strategic importance of values-based digital technology policy for the future of democracy. The Summit setting will provide a vehicle to jump start the process of developing a more strategic digital technology agenda. It will also provide an early opportunity to help heal democratic divisions over tech regulation, align responses to tech-related security threats, and expand tech-based partnership. The Summit should cover the full spectrum of technology policy challenges, including strategic tech R&D investment, tech standard-setting, human rights-based analysis of government and private sector use of data, democratic export controls on technologies of repression, democratic regulation of digital platforms, and civic education on responsible use of social media. In addition to policy, a coordinated plan among trusted democratic partners should be initiated to protect the supply chain for essential technologies, such as semiconductors and 5G infrastructure, as well as strategic commitments from democratic partners for increased R&D investments in emerging technologies. Top policy priorities must include development of a mutually beneficial data sharing arrangement among democracies, and shared norms on government surveillance consistent with human rights principles.
     
  • Following the summit, an ongoing process for developing a shared democratic approach to technology and digital society should be instituted.  The process could be divided into different work streams with different “Digital Technology” (DT) partner-groupings:
  • DT-10:  to develop a strategic technology investment agenda.

Many different configurations are possible. This cohort could be comprised of the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Sweden, Finland, South Korea, Japan, plus Taiwan perhaps as an observer-participant. Its primary aim would be to advance a plan to secure supply-chains for critical tech and joint strategic investments in emerging tech.

  • DT-12: to resolve democratic tensions and seek harmony on digital technology policies.

This group could be comprised of the G7, the EU, Australia, New Zealand, India, and Brazil. Its aim would be to resolve tensions between democratic allies over appropriate checks on government and private sector used of data, as well as harmonious regulatory approaches to private sector platforms.

  • DT+: to defend democratic, human rights-based governance of digital society

This group should include all FOC members (Australia, Austria, Canada, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Maldives, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, UK, U.S.), and be open to other democratic allies. The focal point will be to reinforce commitment to freedom in the digital context and development of a democratic human-rights based approach to governance of digital society.

IV: Combat the emerging digital authoritarian model of governance.

As the U.S. and our democratic allies struggle to address tensions between ourselves and to reconcile our conflicting digital technology policies, we must not lose sight of the threat posed by authoritarian export of technology and norms. A top priority for the U.S. and our democratic allies must be to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat the rise of digital authoritarianism.  To this end, the U.S. must:

  • Renew global advocacy for a free and open internet with an updated vision for how to protect it.
  • Rejoin the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) to rebuild the global normative consensus around internet freedom. The U.S. should lead in developing an advocacy strategy to counter authoritarian influence at norm setting bodies and normalization of authoritarian applications of digital technology that violate human rights.
     
  • Invest in coordinated international diplomacy at multilateral and multistakeholder fora where technology standards and protocols are developed.  

 

  • Resist export of authoritarian digital information infrastructure and support a stronger export control regime for authoritarian surveillance and censorship tools
  • In particular, restrict China’s access to technology and equipment that facilitates domestic semiconductor manufacturing.  

 

  • Prioritize development of civic resilience to cross-border information operations and the spread of propaganda and disinformation by authoritarian governments. Rebuilding trust in information will be essential for civic engagement in democratic digital society. To date, democratic governments have been inadequately prepared to combat these challenges and need significant improvements to stay ahead of adversaries.
     
  • Build a multistakeholder mechanism for developing best practices to combat disinformation, modeled on the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), including a vehicle for information sharing between government, civil society, the research community and the private sector. 
  • Build stronger transnational information sharing mechanisms between democratic allies, to counter foreign malign information operations and share best practices in building civic resilience.;

  • Advocate for new norms for professional reporting on hacked material and disinformation, as proposed in the Stanford Guidelines for reporting on disinformation and hacked material.

  • Increase Investments in building civic resilience to digital disinformation, including public education on norms of civic discourse, media literacy and digital literacy.

  • Advocate for the Transatlantic Commission on Election integrity Election Pledge to strengthen norms and expectations for political candidates and parties to reject and denounce propagation of disinformation around elections should be a normal practice expected of elected officials. 

 

V: Reclaim digital technology for civil society and humanity.

To rally the democratic world around a democratic vision of digital society, the U.S. must help restore a positive vision of how technology can support democracy activity, civic engagement and the enjoyment of human rights. The new administration should invest in innovation and access to technology to empower citizens. To this end, the U.S. should:  

  • Support development of artificial intelligence (AI) applications to achieve the SDGs and advocate for inclusion in the benefits of AI, the data used to feed AI, the coding community that builds AI and in AI policymaking. 
     
  • Role-model inclusivity in the U.S. domestic context, by pledging to provide Internet access for all Americans, with particular focus on access for minorities, vulnerable communities, women, and economically disenfranchised citizens. Invest rural & urban broadband in unserved areas and commit to ensure internet connectivity across the U.S. and advocate for universal internet access internationally. 
     
  • Provide digital security education and tools for U.S. citizens and global civil society and funding for digital and media literacy education and create a fund to invest in emerging technologies to support and encourage civic participation.
     
  • Invest in “E-government” technology innovations that enhance efficiency, security and accountability in government provision of public services. Explore the use of public data trusts, secure digital ID, technology platforms that enhance citizen communication with elected representatives.
     
  • Support global technology innovation and entrepreneurship particularly in the Global South. A genuinely inclusive and democracy-sustaining global internet must entail some “home-grown” digital platforms and services emerging in the developing world, especially in countries where internet adoption is growing fastest.
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Eileen Donahoe

Executive Director, Global Digital Policy Incubator
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Now is the time to rally the world around a democratic vision of digital society.

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Social media and digital technologies have come under fire for their contribution to the development of the groups that ultimately stormed the U.S. Capitol on January 6. Following the insurrection attempt, Facebook, Twitter, Google and other major platforms have banned or suspended President Trump’s accounts. Google and Apple removed Parler from their app stores, while Amazon removed the site from its cloud hosting service, putting an indefinite end to Parler’s reach. This panel will discuss the role of social media during the Trump presidency, including the role of platform policies in fomenting or responding to the recent violence, the benefits and risks posed by steps subsequently taken, and what this means for the future of speech online.

Panelists include:

  • Nate Persily, faculty co-director of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, director of the Center’s Program on Democracy and the Internet, and Professor at Stanford Law School
  • Daphne Keller, Director of the Cyber Policy Center’s Program on Platform Regulation
  • Alex Stamos, Director of the Cyber Policy Center’s Internet Observatory
  • Renee DiResta, Research Manager at the Cyber Policy Center’s Internet Observatory
  • Moderated by Kelly Born, Executive Director of the Cyber Policy Center

 

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Renée DiResta is the former Research Manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory. She investigates the spread of malign narratives across social networks, and assists policymakers in understanding and responding to the problem. She has advised Congress, the State Department, and other academic, civic, and business organizations, and has studied disinformation and computational propaganda in the context of pseudoscience conspiracies, terrorism, and state-sponsored information warfare.

You can see a full list of Renée's writing and speeches on her website: www.reneediresta.com or follow her @noupside.

 

Former Research Manager, Stanford Internet Observatory
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Daphne Keller is the Director of Platform Regulation at the Stanford Program in Law, Science, & Technology. Her academic, policy, and popular press writing focuses on platform regulation and Internet users'; rights in the U.S., EU, and around the world. Her recent work has focused on platform transparency, data collection for artificial intelligence, interoperability models, and “must-carry” obligations. She has testified before legislatures, courts, and regulatory bodies around the world on topics ranging from the practical realities of content moderation to copyright and data protection. She was previously Associate General Counsel for Google, where she had responsibility for the company’s web search products. She is a graduate of Yale Law School, Brown University, and Head Start.

SHORT PIECES

 

ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

 

POLICY PUBLICATIONS

 

FILINGS

  • U.S. Supreme Court amicus brief on behalf of Francis Fukuyama, NetChoice v. Moody (2024)
  • U.S. Supreme Court amicus brief with ACLU, Gonzalez v. Google (2023)
  • Comment to European Commission on data access under EU Digital Services Act
  • U.S. Senate testimony on platform transparency

 

PUBLICATIONS LIST

Director of Platform Regulation, Stanford Program in Law, Science & Technology (LST)
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Former Research Scholar, Stanford Internet Observatory
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Riana Pfefferkorn was a Research Scholar at the Stanford Internet Observatory. She investigated the U.S. and other governments' policies and practices for forcing decryption and/or influencing the security design of online platforms and services, devices, and products, both via technical means and through the courts and legislatures. Riana also studies novel forms of electronic surveillance and data access by U.S. law enforcement and their impact on civil liberties. 

Previously, Riana was the Associate Director of Surveillance and Cybersecurity at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society, where she remains an affiliate. Prior to joining Stanford, she was an associate in the Internet Strategy & Litigation group at the law firm of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, and a law clerk to the Honorable Bruce J. McGiverin of the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. During law school, she interned for the Honorable Stephen Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Riana has spoken at various legal and security conferences, including Black Hat and DEF CON's Crypto & Privacy Village. She is frequently quoted in the press, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, and NPR. Riana is a graduate of the University of Washington School of Law and Whitman College.

Complete list of publications and recent blog posts here.

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Appeared originally in Lawfare, November, 2020

Code is law. Lawrence Lessig’s 1999 assertion was that in a digital world, programmers were scripting a values system into their technology, often in a fit of absent-mindedness. Twenty years later, the U.S. and Europe are living in the geopolitical landscape those early pioneers created. One-time plucky startups have grown into supergiants vacuuming up ever more data and market share. Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming both an enabler for social well-being and an instrument of authoritarian control. Emerging technologies are transforming militaries, creating new battlefields and changing the nature of warfare. U.S. and Chinese officials crisscross the world in a geostrategic great game for 5G dominance. And social media has become a vector for bad actors—including illiberal states like Russia and China—to disrupt and degrade democracies. In 2020, code is power.

The coronavirus has accelerated these trends. The pandemic has fueled data processing in contact-tracing apps; exposed vulnerabilities in supply chains; created new dependencies in classrooms and boardrooms on video communications technologies; and powered a spike in anti-vaxxer disinformation, QAnon conspiracy theories and radicalization.

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Marietje Schaake
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Full article appears in the January/February 2021 issue of Foreign Affairs

Among the many transformations taking place in the U.S. economy, none is more salient than the growth of gigantic Internet platforms. Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Twitter, already powerful before the COVID-19 pandemic, have become even more so during it, as so much of everyday life moves online. As convenient as their technology is, the emergence of such dominant corporations should ring alarm bells—not just because they hold so much economic power but also because they wield so much control over political communication. These behemoths now dominate the dissemination of information and the coordination of political mobilization. That poses unique threats to a well-functioning democracy. 

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Francis Fukuyama
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