Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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the trump takedown

The Facebook Oversight Board will release its decision concerning the takedown of President Donald Trump's account this Wednesday. On Thursday, May 6, from 2:00 to 3:15 PM Pacific, members of the Oversight Board will be joined by the leaders of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center to discuss the Board's decision. Two members of the Oversight Board, Michael McConnell and Julie Owono, will be joined by Nate Persily, Renee DiResta, Daphne Keller, Marietje Schaake and Alex Stamos to discuss the decision and its implications for Facebook's handling of similar controversies around the world.

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this is how they tell me the world ends event at cyber policy center

On Wednesday, May 26 at 10 am pacific time, please join Andrew Grotto, Director of Stanford’s Program on Geopolitics, Technology and Governance, for a conversation with Nicole Perlroth, New York Times Cybersecurity Reporter, about the underground market for cyber-attack capabilities.

In her book This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends: The Cyberweapons Arms Race,” Perlroth argues that the United States government became the world's dominant hoarder of one of the most coveted tools in a spy's arsenal, the zero-day vulnerability. After briefly cornering the market, in her account, the United States then lost control of its hoard and the market.

Perlroth and Grotto, a former Senior Director for Cybersecurity Policy at the White House in both the Obama and Trump Administrations, will talk about the development and evolution of this market, and what it portends about the future of conflict in cyberspace and beyond.

This event is co-sponsored by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Cyber Policy Center.

Praise for “This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends”: “Perlroth's terrifying revelation of how vulnerable American institutions and individuals are to clandestine cyberattacks by malicious hackers is possibly the most important book of the year . . . Perlroth's precise, lucid, and compelling presentation of mind-blowing disclosures about the underground arms race a must-read exposé.” —Booklist, starred review

Nicole Perlroth
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the long fuse: misinformation and the 2020 election

Please join us on Wednesday March 3, 2020 from 3:00-4:30 pm EST (12:00-1:30 PST) for The Long Fuse: Misinformation in the 2020 Election, the public launch of a comprehensive report tracking mis- and disinformation in the 2020 election cycle. The report was produced by the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP), a coalition of research institutions that worked together to detect and mitigate viral falsehoods and to support the real-time information exchange between the research community, election officials, government agencies, civil society organizations, and social media platforms.

The Partnership was set up to monitor false information about the process and results of the 2020 election, in line with the Department of Homeland Security’s designation of elections as critical infrastructure in democracies. In particular, the EIP identified and traced the false “stolen election” narrative which would culminate in the 1/6 attack on the US Capitol. 

The event will begin with a fireside chat with Chris Krebs, the former director of the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), who led the effort to secure electoral infrastructure and the response to mis- and disinformation during the election period. The conversation will contextualize the role and findings of EIP within the government’s efforts to prevent the spread of malign information. Mr. Krebs will share his lessons learned securing this election and will discuss how to build resilient electoral systems going forward. 

Next, this event will feature a discussion with representatives from each of the EIP Partners: the Stanford Internet ObservatoryGraphika, the University of Washington’s Center for an Informed Public, and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab. Panelists will discuss the origins and amplification of voting-related falsehoods, charting how these narratives evolved over time. The panel will also discuss the evolution of social media platforms’ civic integrity policies and the effectiveness of their implementation. Finally, the panel will consider how the EIP can serve as a model for future mis- and disinformation monitoring efforts.   

 

Introductory remarks

Graham Brookie
Director
DFRLab

Alex Stamos
Director
Stanford Internet Observatory

 

Fireside Chat

Chris Krebs
Founding Partner
Krebs Stamos Group LLC

Moderated by

Isabella Garcia-Camargo
Project Manager
Election Integrity Partnership

 

Presentation featuring

Emerson Brooking
Resident Senior Fellow
DFRLab

Camille Francois
Chief Innovation Author
Graphika

Kate Starbird
Associate Professor
Department of Human Centered Design and Engineering 

Renee DiResta
Research Manager
Stanford Internet Observatory

 

Moderated by

Alex Stamos
Director
Stanford Internet Observatory

 

Additional speakers to be announced

 

REGISTER

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Stanford Internet Observatory
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On Thursday, January 28, 2021, Facebook suspended a network it identified which originated primarily in Gaza, but also in Belgium and the UAE. The network included 178 Pages, 3 Groups, 206 profiles and 14 Instagram accounts. Facebook shared these assets with the Stanford Internet Observatory a few hours before they were suspended. The network was suspended not due to the content of its posts, but rather for what Facebook terms coordinated inauthentic behavior; assets pretended to be people and entities they weren't. The operation primarily pushed narratives favorable to Mohammed Dahlan, the leader of the Democratic Reform Current, a faction of the Palestinian Fatah party. Content was mainly in Arabic and Hebrew, but there were also posts in French and English. 

This is the first time Facebook has publicized a takedown of accounts originating in Gaza. While we are aware of claims that Facebook has unfairly suspended Palestinian accounts in the past, we do not weigh in on this discussion. This report only analyzes this single network, which displays clear signs of inauthentic coordination and amplification, as well as impersonation of legitimate media entities.

Key Takeaways

  • The network contained a cluster of Pages that shared content favorable to Dahlan, often reposting from his own Twitter and Facebook accounts. Some of the recent content alluded to Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections that are scheduled to be held this year. This cluster exhibited very straightforward coordination, posting identical content at the same time, from the end of 2016 through the start of 2021. 

  • In addition to the cluster of Pages supporting Dahlan, the network included Pages that pretended to be authentic Israeli media outlets and a think tank. These Pages appeared to primarily repost content from legitimate media outlets and the legitimate think tank. Their role in the information operation is unclear.

  • This operation appears to have existed almost exclusively on Facebook. While many of the suspended profiles had thousands of friends and posted content with a similar slant to the Pages, the Pages themselves were small and had low engagement. We were not able to independently investigate the profiles in depth because Facebook alerted us to the network shortly before it was removed. 

facebook-january2021-takedown Example of an identical post by 19 accounts in the network.

Read More

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Blogs

Stoking Conflict by Keystroke

New Facebook takedowns expose networks of Russian-linked assets targeting Libya, Sudan, Syria, and the Central African Republic.
Stoking Conflict by Keystroke
takedown report headliner
Blogs

Analysis of an October 2020 Facebook Takedown Linked to U.S. Political Consultancy Rally Forge

An astroturfing operation involving fake accounts (some with AI-generated images) that left thousands of comments on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. Clients included Turning Point Action and Inclusive Conservation Group, a pro-hunting organization.
Analysis of an October 2020 Facebook Takedown Linked to U.S. Political Consultancy Rally Forge
Nigeria Takedown twitter graphic
Blogs

Analysis of an October 2020 Facebook Takedown Linked to the Islamic Movement in Nigeria

In this post and in the attached report we investigate an operation that called for the release from prison of Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky.
Analysis of an October 2020 Facebook Takedown Linked to the Islamic Movement in Nigeria
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An Investigation Into a Suspended Facebook Network Supporting the Leader of the Palestinian Democratic Reform Current

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End-to-end encrypted (E2EE) communications have been around for decades, but the deployment of default E2EE on billion-user platforms has new impacts for user privacy and safety. The deployment comes with benefits to both individuals and society but it also creates new risks, as long-existing models of messenger abuse can now flourish in an environment where automated or human review cannot reach. New E2EE products raise the prospect of less understood risks by adding discoverability to encrypted platforms, allowing contact from strangers and increasing the risk of certain types of abuse. This workshop will place a particular focus on platform benefits and risks that impact civil society organizations, with a specific focus on the global south. Through a series of workshops and policy papers, the Stanford Internet Observatory is facilitating open and productive dialogue on this contentious topic to find common ground. 

An important defining principle behind this workshop series is the explicit assumption that E2EE is here to stay. To that end, our workshops have set aside any discussion of exceptional access (aka backdoor) designs. This debate has raged between industry, academic cryptographers and law enforcement for decades and little progress has been made. We focus instead on interventions that can be used to reduce the harm of E2E encrypted communication products that have been less widely explored or implemented. 

Submissions for working papers and requests to attend will be accepted up to 10 days before the event. Accepted submitters will be invited to present or attend our upcoming workshops. 

SUBMIT HERE

Webinar

Workshops
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End-to-end encrypted (E2EE) communications have been around for decades, but the deployment of default E2EE on billion-user platforms has new impacts for user privacy and safety. The deployment comes with benefits to both individuals and society but it also creates new risks, as long-existing models of messenger abuse can now flourish in an environment where automated or human review cannot reach. New E2EE products raise the prospect of less understood risks by adding discoverability to encrypted platforms, allowing contact from strangers and increasing the risk of certain types of abuse. This workshop will place a particular focus on platform benefits and risks that impact civil society organizations, with a specific focus on the global south. Through a series of workshops and policy papers, the Stanford Internet Observatory is facilitating open and productive dialogue on this contentious topic to find common ground. 

An important defining principle behind this workshop series is the explicit assumption that E2EE is here to stay. To that end, our workshops have set aside any discussion of exceptional access (aka backdoor) designs. This debate has raged between industry, academic cryptographers and law enforcement for decades and little progress has been made. We focus instead on interventions that can be used to reduce the harm of E2E encrypted communication products that have been less widely explored or implemented. 

Submissions for working papers and requests to attend will be accepted up to 10 days before the event. Accepted submitters will be invited to present or attend our upcoming workshops. 

SUBMIT HERE

Webinar

Workshops
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A new administration and Congress provide a key opportunity to improve US cybersecurity and the governance of digital technologies. Yet the challenges appear daunting: viral disinformation, widespread privacy violations, algorithms biased by race, class and gender, ransomware running rampant, and unprecedented tech company scale and market dominance. Additionally, the US faces a persistent deficit in skilled cybersecurity workers, a lack of diversity in the field, and a public with wildly unequal broadband internet access.  Meanwhile, competition among governance regimes, specifically between the United States, Europe and China, has raised the stakes over whether democracies or authoritarian governments will set the rules for the internet. The policy choices made by the new administration will play a pivotal role in shaping our global future. On February 24 at 10am PST, join Kelly Born and Marietje Schaake of Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center, Michael Daniel of the Aspen Institute’s Cyber Group, and Karen Kornbluh for the German Marshall Fund to discuss cyber policy priorities for the new administration.

 

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marietje.schaake

Marietje Schaake is a non-resident Fellow at Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center and at the Institute for Human-Centered AI. She is a columnist for the Financial Times and serves on a number of not-for-profit Boards as well as the UN's High Level Advisory Body on AI. Between 2009-2019 she served as a Member of European Parliament where she worked on trade-, foreign- and tech policy. She is the author of The Tech Coup.


 

Non-Resident Fellow, Cyber Policy Center
Fellow, Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence
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Karen Kornbluh
Michael Daniel
Seminars
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Matt Masterson

Matt Masterson is a former non-resident policy fellow with the Stanford Internet Observatory. He served as Senior Cybersecurity Advisor at the Department of Homeland Security, where he focused on election security issues. He previously served as a Commissioner at the Election Assistance Commission from December 2014 until March 2018, including serving as the Commission’s Chairman in 2017-2018. Prior to that, he held staff positions with the Ohio Secretary of State’s office, where he oversaw voting-system certification efforts and helped develop an online voter registration system. Matt holds a law degree from the University of Dayton School of Law and BS and BA degrees from Miami University in Oxford, Ohio.

As part of his Stanford Internet Observatory fellowship, Matt compiled and published an oral history of the 2020 election, "The Guardians of Democracy."

Former Non-Resident Fellow, Stanford Internet Observatory
Authors
Jody Berger
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News
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 In her new role, Riana will continue her work researching and analyzing the U.S. and other countries’ policies regarding encryption, particularly as it relates to law enforcement access to user data and communications. Riana also studies novel forms of electronic surveillance and data access by U.S. law enforcement and their impact on civil liberties. Prior to joining Stanford, Riana was an associate in the Internet Strategy & Litigation group at the law firm of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. She started her career as a law clerk to a federal magistrate judge.

Q: Why is the debate around encryption so important?

A: Encryption is crucial to protecting the security and privacy of our important data. That includes banking, financial transactions, web surfing, email, cloud storage, sensitive health data—the list goes on. In recent years, it’s become easy for us to encrypt our smartphones, computers, chat messages, and (lately) video calls, mostly without having to think about it or fiddle with confusing software settings.

Using encryption to shield our data and communications from malicious actors or accidental breaches has become even more vitally important since the world shut down last March due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Many of the sensitive conversations that we might once have had face-to-face were forced to move online, from “telehealth” doctor appointments to video calls with therapists to heart-to-hearts with dear friends.

People deserve privacy, period. Our data deserves to be secure. And beyond average people like you or me, there’s also a major economic need for strong data protection—not to mention that it’s a serious national security issue. Our elected officials, government agencies, military, financial institutions, businesses, and even scientific researchers have to worry about keeping their data private and secure, too.

Encryption is just about the best tool we’ve got for protecting all of those interests and preventing the very real harms that come from poor data security. It seems like every day brings another headline in the news about a devastating hack by a foreign adversary, or the latest company to suffer a major data breach.

That’s why the periodic calls from law enforcement and some politicians to weaken the encryption that protects our communications and electronic devices are so misguided. Law enforcement officials point out that encrypted devices and apps are also used by criminals, not just innocent people, making their jobs harder. But what they fail to highlight is how vital encryption is to protecting us from criminals, terrorists, and foreign adversaries. The benefits of encryption far outweigh the downsides.

Q. Can you explain where that debate stands now and where it might be heading?

A. I think 2021 is shaping up to be a really momentous year. We might see the same trends that we saw in 2020 around the introduction, both domestically and in other countries, of much more aggressive laws and regulations about online data, content moderation, and companies’ ability to provide strong encryption capabilities to their users.

The encryption debate and entwined debates around content moderation and platform regulation—what my colleague Daphne Keller works on here at CPC—all those things are going to come to a head. And none of it is going to go away due to the change in the administration. We’re going to have a lot of the same members of Congress who are pushing the same regulatory proposals in this Congress that we saw in the 116th Congress when it comes to encryption, trust and safety, and content moderation issues.

Q: Will the change in Washington, D.C., change the debate around these issues?

A: The change in administration is helpful in some ways. It will mean a more consistent approach to national security issues and how cybersecurity fits in with national security issue. The approach will be less scattershot and more based on evidence rather than prejudices.

Mostly, I’m looking forward to a return to norms, predictability, and as a lawyer, respect for the rule of law, for procedure and for doing things the correct way. I’m sure a lot of America’s allies are looking forward to that too. In the near term, following the violent insurrection at the Capitol on January 6, I’m just hoping for a peaceful transfer of power with no assassinations, which is not a sentence I ever thought I’d say about my own country. Those events and their aftermath have put a new twist on the debates around encryption and content moderation that is still playing out.

And within the Cyber Policy Center, I think we will have the ear of the administration and that they will listen to us, given how many people at CPC formerly were in government. Encryption policy and content moderation have been solidly bipartisan concerns in recent years, so it’s no longer just a topic for one or the other party to stump on when they’re in power. The way the political parties approach the issue may differ, or why they think it’s an issue may differ, but there are threats to strong encryption, threats to cyber security and to the freedom of the net that come from a bipartisan place. So we will have to think carefully about how to speak to policymakers, or what messages we can use to impress upon people coming from various sides of the issue and different sides of the aisle why strong cyber security matters, why strong encryption matters.

Q: After five years with the Center for Internet and Society, what are the reasons you decided to join the Stanford Internet Observatory?

A: For a few years, I’ve been working with Alex Stamos, who founded and directs SIO. He brought me in to co-teach the Hack Lab, which shows students the common types of attacks used in cybercrime and cyberwarfare. In the course, I fill in the gaps around the legal issues that students were interested in hearing about. It turned out to be a very complementary combination to talk about not just the technologies involved that he teaches around offensive cyber security issues but to bring in, ‘Well, what are the legal implications?’ And now that the Hack Lab is a required course for the Master’s in International Policy students, we also ask ‘What are the policy implications?’

At SIO, Alex has assembled a team of people who are technologists and social scientists and who have a government background. With my training in the law and a legal background, I look at the issues from the civil liberties tradition that we had at CIS. I also look through a business needs lens, having been an outside counsel to big tech companies.

Q: With CIS, you blogged at an impressive rate. Will you post as often in your new role?

A: That’s always been my goal, at least since I’ve been at CIS, to publish regularly and publish in a format that is accessible to a broad audience and speaks to a relatively broad audience and obviously a policymaker-type focus.

Having come to Stanford originally to work on the encryption debate as an issue back in 2015, it’s something where I feel that explaining why encryption matters, why strong cybersecurity matters to a lay audience is very important, because everyday people and everyday users are in a position to need to understand how to protect themselves and their data and to be able to talk to their legislators about the issue. I thought it was important to dissect what can be dense legislative proposals, or talk about the latest idea for how to give access for law enforcement to encrypted content, and to explain it in a way that would reach more people.

Riana Pfefferkorn

Riana Pfefferkorn

Research Scholar, SIO
Full Bio
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Riana Pfefferkorn joined the Stanford Internet Observatory as a research scholar in December. She comes from Stanford’s Center for Internet and Society, where she was the Associate Director of Surveillance and Cybersecurity.

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What rules for the web? That question has been given new urgency on January 6th. The European Union, at the end of 2020, proposed the Digital Services Act (DSA). This new legislation aims at creating clarity about the responsibility of tech platforms and intermediaries. European rules, just as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) did, will likely have ripple effects worldwide. Is there room for transatlantic alignment? How do values translate into enforceable rules? Can fundamental rights and economic growth go hand in hand? And who keep the gatekeepers in check? We will dive into the proposed Digital Services Act with leading European experts.

Join Stanford Cyber Policy Center's Marietje Schaake, International Policy Director and former Member of European Parliament in conversation with the CPC’s Daphne Keller, Director of the Center for Internet and Society, Guillermo Beltrà Navarro, European Union’s Digital Policy Lead, Eliška Pírková, Access Now’s Europe Policy Analyst and Joris van Hoboken, Professor of Law at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels.

 

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daphne-keller-headshot.jpg

Daphne Keller's work focuses on platform regulation and Internet users' rights. She has testified before legislatures, courts, and regulatory bodies around the world, and published both academically and in popular press on topics including platform content moderation practices, constitutional and human rights law, copyright, data protection, and national courts' global takedown orders. Her recent work focuses on legal protections for users’ free expression rights when state and private power intersect, particularly through platforms’ enforcement of Terms of Service or use of algorithmic ranking and recommendations. Until 2020, Daphne was the Director of Intermediary Liability at Stanford's Center for Internet and Society. She also served until 2015 as Associate General Counsel for Google, where she had primary responsibility for the company’s search products. Daphne has taught Internet law at Stanford, Berkeley, and Duke law schools. She is a graduate of Yale Law School, Brown University, and Head Start.

Other Affiliations and Roles:

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Director of Program on Platform Regulation, Cyber Policy Center
Lecturer, Stanford Law School
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marietje.schaake

Marietje Schaake is a non-resident Fellow at Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center and at the Institute for Human-Centered AI. She is a columnist for the Financial Times and serves on a number of not-for-profit Boards as well as the UN's High Level Advisory Body on AI. Between 2009-2019 she served as a Member of European Parliament where she worked on trade-, foreign- and tech policy. She is the author of The Tech Coup.


 

Non-Resident Fellow, Cyber Policy Center
Fellow, Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence
Date Label
Guillermo Beltrà Navarro
Joris van Hoboken
Eliška Pírková
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