Authors
Melissa De Witte
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

This interview by Melissa De Witte originally appeared in Stanford News.


The upcoming summit between President Joe Biden and President Vladimir Putin is not rewarding the Russian leader for his bad behavior: It’s opening negotiations and delivering a warning to him instead, says Stanford scholar Kathryn Stoner.

Here, Stoner is joined by Stanford political scientist and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, Payne Distinguished Lecturer at CISAC and former Deputy Secretary General of NATO Rose Gottemoeller and Russia historian Norman Naimark to discuss what to expect at the summit in Geneva on Wednesday.

The meeting, the scholars say, could reset U.S.-Russia relations, signal deterrence on certain issues – including cybersecurity in light of attacks like the SolarWinds breach that the U.S. has blamed on the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service – and launch strategic stability talks related to nuclear weapons.

Interviews have been edited for length and clarity. For more information on what to expect about the Biden-Putin summit from FSI scholars, visit the FSI website.


Where does diplomacy now stand between the U.S. and Russia?

Naimark: Russian-American relations are at their lowest point since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, perhaps even since the last years of Gorbachev’s rule. When relations are fraying between the world’s two most powerful nuclear powers, the coming of the summit on June 16 between President Biden and President Putin should be welcomed. It’s worth recalling the heightened military tensions just three months ago between Moscow and Washington, when Moscow moved tens of thousands of troops to the Ukrainian border and mobilized its air and sea power in the region. Both leaders have emphasized that they seek stability, reliability and predictability in their bilateral relations; at the same time, their respective administrations have warned that expectations should be kept at the minimum for any kind of serious breakthrough at the summit.

Stoner: We’ve lost a lot of leverage because of the withdrawal from global politics that started under the latter part of the Obama administration and continued with Trump with his America First platform, which meant America alone. There is some leverage, it’s just how much. We don’t necessarily want to destabilize Russia because it’s a big, complicated country with nuclear weapons, but all signs point to Putin staying in office until 2036. He’s not going away. I think we have to try to signal deterrence on certain issues, like trying to move into another former Soviet republic as he is doing with Ukraine, Georgia and potentially Belarus, but then cooperate in other areas where it is productive to do so.

What do you think about some of the criticisms toward Biden meeting with Putin? For example, that Biden meeting with Putin is only rewarding him for his bad behavior.

Stoner: There is a reasonable question about why Biden and Putin are meeting and if it is somehow rewarding Putin for bad behavior by having a summit with the President of the United States. Rather than rewarding Putin, however, I think this meeting could be Biden’s warning to him that if hacking and other cyberattacks continue, we have a menu of things we could do as well.

Naimark: There is no reason that the American president cannot talk about difficult subjects like cybersecurity, ransomware attacks, human rights, the release of Alexei Navalny, the protection of Ukrainian sovereignty and other important items on the American agenda while focusing on issues of mutual interest: the future of arms control, global warming and the regulation of the Arctic, and outer space. One can always hope that, like the last summit on Lake Geneva between Russian and American leaders [Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan] in November 1985, this one can lay the groundwork for serious improvements in relations in the near future.

Is this meeting a reset of diplomatic relations between the two nations?

Stoner: I know in Washington it is popular to say that Biden is not having a reset of relations with Russia when past presidents all have tried that. I think that’s wrong. I do think it is a reset in the relationship in that there should be more clarity and stability, but that doesn’t mean it’s going to be friendly and universally cooperative, given that we still see many differences in perspectives and some antagonism too. Still, Russia and the U.S. need to talk because there are a lot of issues in common where it would be helpful to coordinate with Russia. After all, even in the depths of the Cold War, the leaders of both countries still talked. Russia has reestablished itself as the most formidable power in Europe and it looks like Biden is acknowledging that and the fact that the U.S. can no longer afford to ignore Russia.

Is there anything the two leaders will be able to agree upon?

McFaul: I used to organize these kinds of meetings when I worked in the government and back when President Medvedev was there. We would have these meetings as a way to force our governments to produce what is called in State Department-speak “deliverables.” We didn’t have meetings to have them, we wanted to get things done. In the first Obama-Medvedev meeting we had a long list of deliverables when they met in July of 2009.

But there is no way that will happen with Putin today because he doesn’t really want to cooperate, he doesn’t really want deliverables. That’s challenging for President Biden, I think, because he has said that he wants a stable, predictable relationship with Putin. I think that’s fine to aspire to, but I don’t think Putin is that interested in that kind of relationship, so that creates a challenge of substance for summits like this.

Gottemoeller: With such different threat perceptions, the two presidents are not going to agree in Geneva about what should go into the next nuclear treaty. They can agree, though, to put their experts together to hammer it out. They can also agree to put the two sides together to tackle the different threat perceptions and the question of what stability means. Finally, they can agree to a deadline, so the talks don’t stall. It won’t be a headline-grabbing outcome, but at least Moscow and Washington will get moving again on the nuclear agenda.

Where can Biden make progress?

McFaul: I think the most likely place to make progress is to launch strategic stability talks, which is an abstract phrase for beginning the process of negotiations about nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles that would be a follow-on to the New START treaty. Biden and Putin rightfully extended the New START treaty early in his term for five years, and I think that was very smart. I personally worked on that treaty, so I think it’s a good treaty and deserves to be extended. But it’s going to run out really fast because the next set of negotiations are going to be much more complicated. I hope they would start some process to begin those negotiations now.

Gottemoeller: Maybe the only place where President Biden can make progress with Vladimir Putin in Geneva is the nuclear agenda with Russia. Since the two men agreed, in February, to extend the New START treaty by five years, they have put out a clear public message that they intend to pursue a deal to replace New START and to launch strategic stability talks. They are not going to have identical ideas, however, about what those two goals mean.

Biden wants a new arms control deal that will control all nuclear warheads, whether launched on intercontinental strategic-range missiles or on shorter-range systems. He also wants to get a handle on some of the new types of nuclear weapons that the Russians have been developing. One new system, for example, uses nuclear propulsion to ensure that it can fly for many hours at great speed over long distances, earning it the moniker “weapon of vengeance.” These exotic weapons did not exist when New START was negotiated; now, they need to be controlled.

Putin, by contrast, focuses on U.S. long-range conventional missiles that he worries are capable of the accuracy and destructive power of nuclear weapons. The United States, in his view, could use these conventional weapons to destroy hard targets such as the Moscow nuclear command center. He also worries that the United States is producing ever more capable ways to intercept his nuclear missiles and destroy them before they reach their targets. In his worst nightmare, the United States undermines his nuclear deterrent forces without ever resorting to nuclear weapons.

What advice do you have for Biden?

McFaul: One, do not have a one-on-one meeting – just have a normal meeting. Two, I would recommend not having a joint press conference that just gives Putin a podium for the world to say his “whataboutism” stuff; it’s better to have separate press conferences because most of the world will be more interested in what Biden says compared to what Putin says.

Third, I think it’s important to cooperate when you can but also be clear about your differences and don’t pull punches on that. In particular, I want Biden to talk about Alexei Navalny, the Americans who are wrongly detained in Russia today, Crimea still being occupied, Russian proxies in eastern Ukraine, and parts of Georgia that are under occupation. They have been attacking us relentlessly with these cyberattacks, these Russian criminals who in my view have to have some association with the Russian government.

That’s a tough list, but I think it’s really important for President Biden to say those things directly to Putin. I have confidence that he can. I was at their last meeting. I traveled with the vice president in 2011 when he met with then Prime Minister Putin. Biden is capable of delivering tough messages and I hope he uses this occasion to do so again.

What would be a sign that their meeting was productive?

Stoner: One sign the meeting was productive would be if Biden and Putin could agree to establish a joint committee or council on some rules surrounding cybersecurity. Another would be if they make plans to talk again about either replacing or reviving the Minsk-2 agreement [that sought to bring an end to Russia’s war on Ukraine]. And three, a positive sign would be if they plan to do some negotiation on further reducing tactical nuclear weapons or strategic nuclear weapons. An agreement to disagree on some issues, but to continue talking on others would be indicative of at least some small progress.

The Russian and American flags flying side by side

Assessing the Biden-Putin Summit

Analysis and commentary on the Biden-Putin summit from FSI scholars.
Learn More

Read More

All News button
1
Subtitle

Scholars at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies hope that President Joe Biden’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin will lay the groundwork for negotiations in the near future, particularly around nuclear weapons.

Authors
Jack Cable
Zoe Huczok
W.E.
News Type
Blogs
Date
Paragraphs

En octobre 2020 se tiendra en Guinée une élection présidentielle cruciale, qui déterminera si le Président Alpha Condé poursuivra son mandat pour une nouvelle décennie, ou si le pays connaîtra le premier changement de régime démocratique de son histoire. L’élection a aussi d’importantes implications économiques pour les investisseurs étrangers en Guinée.

Dans les mois précédant l’élection, nous avons identifié un réseau de 94 Pages Facebook qui relaient, de manière coordonnée, des publications favorables à Condé et à son parti. Ces Pages, qui comptent au total plus de 800 000 abonnés, publient des textes et des images pro-Condé, et promeuvent des vidéos qui proviennent de médias affiliés au gouvernement. Un faisceau d’indices – des événements relatés dans la presse, des pratiques de publication spécifiques, d’autres éléments encore – permet d’établir un lien entre ces Pages et le parti de Condé, le Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen (RPG). Plus spécifiquement, il établit un lien avec son équipe de “volontaires communicants” (“Volcom” en abrégé), en réalité salariés du RPG. Les administrateurs des Pages du réseau dissimulent leurs véritables identités sous de faux noms comme « Alpha le Démocrate ». Les Pages ne révèlent pas les relations formelles, voire salariées, de leurs auteurs avec le RPG. 

Nous avons partagé une version de cet article, ainsi que les données associées, avec Facebook. Facebook a estimé que les Pages et comptes de ce réseau ne constituent pas une « action inauthentique concertée », et le réseau n’a pas été suspendu. Bien que les activités que nous avons découvertes ne suffisent pas à justifier une action répressive de la part de Facebook, comme la suppression des comptes, ou l’étiquetage des Pages, il nous semble que ces activités ne favorisent pas une vie politique transparente ou des élections équitables. Le cas de la Guinée soulève des questions plus larges : où et comment faire la distinction entre une campagne électorale moderne et des « actions inauthentiques concertées » ?

Contexte

Alpha Condé est le premier président démocratiquement élu en Guinée et a servi deux mandats de cinq ans depuis sa prise de pouvoir en 2010. En mars 2020, il a tenu un référendum pour approuver une nouvelle constitution qui prévoit, entre autres changements, de fixer de nouvelles limites pour les mandats présidentiels. Sous cette nouvelle Constitution, Condé pourrait demeurer au pouvoir pour douze ans supplémentaires. Des manifestants sont descendus dans la rue dans les mois menant au référendum, parfois réprimés par la force. Ils ont également échangé leurs points de vue sur Facebook, le principal réseau social de Guinée, qui compte deux millions de comptes pour environ treize millions d’habitants. Le parti au pouvoir et l’opposition utilisent tous deux Facebook comme la principale plateforme de diffusion de leur communication politique. Cela fait de Facebook un forum clé pour influencer les électeurs et créer l'illusion de soutiens spontanés.

Le réseau des Volcom du RPG

Le réseau de Pages du RPG n’est ni petit, ni discret. Nous avons identifié deux des principales Pages de ce réseau, parce qu’elles sont parmi les seules à placer des publicités politiques en Guinée (comme cela est consigné dans la bibliothèque de publicités de Facebook, la Facebook Ad Library). Il nous est vite apparu évident que des dizaines d’autres Pages et Groupes interagissent avec ces Pages, de façon coordonnée : des publications et des images identiques, diffusées par des comptes qui présentent souvent la même photo de profil.

Publication vantant les barrages hydroélectriques construits par Condé. Image 1 : Publication vantant les barrages hydroélectriques construits par Condé.

La plupart du contenu de ces Pages fait l’éloge de la politique et du caractère du président Alpha Condé dans un style journalistique soutenu, avec une syntaxe et un vocabulaire sophistiqués. Certaines publications font référence à des faits précis, émaillés de chiffres et d’autres éléments de preuve. Par exemple, une publication du groupe « Guinéens, ouvrez les yeux » (également retrouvée sur six autres Pages du réseau) célèbre la construction de barrages hydroélectriques par le président Condé, dont un barrage controversé financé par la Chine (Image 1).

Au cours de notre enquête dans ce réseau visiblement organisé, nous avons trouvé des articles de presse sur les individus régulièrement identifiés dans les publications du réseau. L’attention des médias de focalise sur les « Volontaires Communicants » (ou « Volcom ») un groupe de communicants politiques employés et salariés par le RPG pour promouvoir Condé et sa politique.   De nombreux membres des Volcom parlent librement de leurs activités. Par exemple, Korbonya Balde se présente sur son compte Facebook comme travaillant pour la « Cellule de Communication du RPG Arc-en-Ciel ». Balde a été arrêté en 2018 pour incitation à la haine raciale et à la violence envers les opposants politiques du RPG sur les réseaux sociaux. En février, les Volcom ont entamé une grève pour dénoncer leurs conditions de travail – un événement qui, d’après nos sources guinéennes, a suscité une attention considérable parmi l’élite guinéenne. 

La couverture médiatique de la grève des Volcom a mis en exergue une partie de leurs soutiens au sein du gouvernement guinéen, suggérant que Albert Damantang Camara, Ministre de la Sécurité et la Protection Civile, Hadja Aissatou Béla Diallo, ministre conseillère chargée de mission auprès du président, Madina Thiam (la fille de Diallo) et Souleimane Keita, un membre influent du parti et conseiller présidentiel, financent collectivement les Volcom. 

Bien que l’organigramme des Volcom ne soit pas public, au moins deux de leurs membres semblent avoir une influence notable au sein du groupe. Ibrahima Kallo est désigné par d’autres utilisateurs Facebook et plusieurs médias comme « le chef des Volcom ». Il a récemment été nommé comme attaché auprès de Diakara Koulibaly, Ministre des Hydrocarbures. Sa présence sur les réseaux sociaux (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Snapchat) est prolifique. Il semble aussi avoir un accès privilégié à Condé, comme plusieurs images et liens d’identification (tags) l’attestent. Charles Kolie, mieux connu sous son alias Facebook « Continuité Continuité » semble également avoir un rôle de coordinateur au sein de Volcom. Une biographie publiée sur Facebook affirme que Kolie a rempli plusieurs fonctions au sein du RPG jusqu’en 2007, et qu’il est coordinateur national de Volcom depuis 2018.

Sur la base de ces éléments, nous avons élaboré des critères pour établir des liens entre les Pages pro-Condé que nous avons découvertes et les Volcom. Nous attribuons une Page aux Volcom avec un haut niveau de certitude si elle satisfait au moins deux de ces critères :

  • Les Volcoms sont mentionnés explicitement, dans des publications ou dans les informations de la Page. Cela passe souvent par l’usage de mots-dièse comme #Volcom_rpg_AEC ou #Volcoms.

  • Des membres de Volcom sont identifiés dans des publications de la Page, ou des publications de membres des Volcom sont reprises sur la Page, ou les publications de la Page sont régulièrement reprises par des membres des Volcom.

  • Au moins une publication (texte ou image) a été recopiée directement depuis une autre Page. Dans au moins un sous-ensemble de Pages, nous avons remarqué que les heures de publication et le contenu étaient très largement coordonnés.

  • Des similitudes dans les métadonnées des Pages, notamment la date de création de la page, la date de mise à jour des photos de profil, l’adresse email ou téléphonique de contact, ou encore la localisation de l’administrateur.

Exemples de Pages du réseau Volcom. Image 2 : Exemples de Pages du réseau Volcom.

Nous avons identifié 94 Pages que nous attribuons avec un haut niveau de certitude au réseau Volcom. La plupart des Pages du réseau ont été créées à la fin de 2019 ou au début de 2020, et vingt-cinq d’entre elles ont été créées le 27 mars 2020. La plupart des Pages ont entre plusieurs centaines et plusieurs milliers d’abonnés, et quatorze en ont au moins 10 000 (voir les exemples de deux pages dans l’Image 1). La plus importante (« Le coin des guinéens ») a plus de 352 000 abonnés, ce qui pourrait suggérer que presqu’un utilisateur Facebook guinéen sur cinq est abonné à cette Page. Aucune des Pages ne déclare que son contenu émane d’employés du parti RPG ou du gouvernement. Par exemple, dans sa section « A propos », la Page « Guinéens, Ouvrez les Yeux » déclare seulement être « une page créée par des analystes dans le but de dénoncer, critiquer et apporter des solutions sur les différentes mutations de la Guinée ».

Exemple de publications identiques dont la diffusion est coordonnée. Image 3 : Exemple de publications identiques dont la diffusion est coordonnée.

Le réseau présente des formes de coordination, y compris la répétition de publications parfaitement identiques à travers plusieurs Pages. Par exemple, la publication en Image 3, qui critique le Front National pour la Défense de la Constitution (FNDC), une coalition de partis d’opposition guinéens, a été publiée presque simultanément le 31 mai sur au moins trois Pages Facebook : à 9h58 sur « Le Forum Républicain », à 10h00 sur « Guinéens, Changeons de Mentalité » et sur « Allons au référendum dans la paix et la concorde ». Plus tard ce même jour, la même publication est apparue sur deux autres Pages du réseau, « Le coin des guinéens » et « Pr Alpha Condé Pour Tous ». 

Activité de publication, Ensemble 1. En surligné, la période de 3 semaines au cours de laquelle la coordination est la plus marquée. Image 4 : Activité de publication, Ensemble 1. En surligné, la période de 3 semaines au cours de laquelle la coordination est la plus marquée.

Une telle activité de publication coordonnée est fréquente parmi les Pages du réseau. Nous avons identifié deux ensembles de Pages au sein du réseau qui présentent des activités de publication hautement coordonnées. L’ensemble 1 (Image 4) comprend 15 Pages qui publient régulièrement le même contenu approximativement à la même heure. Ces Pages ont 185 000 abonnés au total, ce qui représente 23 pourcents des abonnés du réseau général. Dix de ces Pages ont un seul administrateur, localisé en Turquie, ce qui pourrait suggérer qu’un même individu ou entreprise pourrait être impliqué dans la gestion de ces Pages. Par ailleurs, sept autres Pages ont également un administrateur en Turquie, ce qui porte le total à dix-sept Pages dans le réseau. Bien que d’autres Pages au sein du réseau aient des administrateurs dans des pays étrangers, comme les Etats-Unis, la France, le Maroc, l’Espagne et l’Inde, le nombre de Pages administrées depuis la Turquie est bien plus important.

Ensemble 2, Activité de publication coordonnée. Image 5 : Ensemble 2, Activité de publication coordonnée.

L’ensemble 2 (Image 5) comprend 14 plus petites Pages avec 2896 abonnés au total. Toutes les Pages de cet ensemble ont été créées les 26 et 27 mars 2020. A juger par leur faible nombre d’abonnés et d’interactions, nous faisons l’hypothèse que les Pages de cet ensemble sont encore en train de construire leur audience, ou qu’elles servent à grossir les statistiques d’interaction d’autres Pages. Leurs activités de publication sont gérées de manière parallèle, ce qui suggère que des techniques d’automatisation sont utilisées pour gérer ces Pages. 

Outre leurs activités de publication coordonnées, ces Pages ont tendance à partager les publications de deux médias vidéo liés au RPG : Alpha Condé TV et 224Minutes (à noter, la Page de 224Minutes a été retirée de Facebook en septembre 2020, peu avant la publication de cet article). La presse guinéenne attribue la direction d’Alpha Condé TV à Madina Thiam, également marraine des Volcom. 224Minutes a précédemment été épinglé par les plateformes de réseaux sociaux pour des violations de leurs conditions d’utilisation : son premier compte Twitter a été suspendu, et Facebook bloque tous les liens extérieurs vers 224minutes.net, affichant le message suivant : « Le lien auquel vous avez tenté d'accéder est contraire à nos Standards de la Communauté ». Sur les Pages Facebook d’Alpha Condé TV et 224Minutes, plusieurs publications présentent un nombre de partages particulièrement élevé au regard de leurs mentions « j’aime », ce qui est suspect. Une publication récente d’Alpha Condé TV, par exemple, a seulement 96 mentions « j’aime » et 67 commentaires mais a été partagée 4000 fois dans les 16 heures.

Exemples de comptes utilisant Condé ou Poutine comme photos de profil. Image 6 : Exemples de comptes utilisant Condé ou Poutine comme photos de profil.

Les Pages des Volcom sont largement diffusées grâce à un réseau de comptes Facebook géré par les communicants du RPG. La plupart des utilisateurs qui « aiment », commentent ou partagent les Pages du réseau publient presqu’exclusivement du contenu sur Condé sur leurs propres profils personnels. Plusieurs d’entre eux ont les mêmes portraits de Vladimir Poutine ou de Condé comme photos de profil et de couverture (Image 6, Alpha Mon Choix et Politologue Traoré). Certains de ces comptes se présentent comme employés par le RPG Arc-en-Ciel, le parti de Condé.

Exemple d'utilisateur partageant une même publication Volcom dans plusieurs groupes. Image 7 : Exemple d'utilisateur partageant une même publication Volcom dans plusieurs groupes.

Ces utilisateurs partagent des contenus issus des Pages du réseau sur leurs propres journaux ou sur des Groupes : les comptes individuels partagent souvent la même publication de nombreuses fois (Image 7). Ils relaient ces publications dans des Groupes neutres, ou même d’opposition, qui ne sont pas contrôlés par Volcom, touchant ainsi un plus grand nombre de Guinéens. Bien que ces utilisateurs se livrent à des activités de publication coordonnées et que plusieurs utilisent clairement de faux noms, il ne s’agit pas nécessairement d’identités complètement fictives. Ainsi, les photos de ces comptes semblent bien être d’une seule et même personne, engagée dans diverses activités, souvent politiques. De plus, nous n’interprétons pas la prolifération de photos de Poutine comme un signe d’interférence russe. Ce phénomène semble plutôt motivé par le parallèle entre Condé et Poutine, qui a également légitimé un changement à la constitution de son pays pour demeurer au pouvoir. En utilisant l’image de Poutine, les soutiens de Condé évoquent les deux décennies de Poutine en Russie comme un modèle de la stabilité et de la continuité auxquelles ils aspirent pour la Guinée.

Des liens avec l'étranger: la Turquie

Publications favorables à Albayrak, issues de Pages du réseau Volcom. Image 8 : Publications favorables à Albayrak, issues de Pages du réseau Volcom.

Etant donné le nombre important de pages gérées par des administrateurs turcs (ou basés en Turquie), nous avons analysé les comportements de publication sur les sujets d’intérêt pour la Turquie. Le réseau des Volcom (y compris les Pages sans administrateur turc) a publié plusieurs articles au sujet d’un conglomérat turc étroitement lié à Condé : le groupe Albayrak, présidé par Ahmet Calik, allié proche d’Erdogan, et précédemment dirigé par Berat Albayrak, gendre d’Erdogan. Les publications mentionnent Albayrak en termes positifs, célébrant les dons d’Albayrak à la Guinée durant la crise du Covid-19 (avec une vidéo du groupe Albayrak) et la mise en place d’un service de collecte de déchets à Conakry (Image 8).

Photo de Condé et Calik, publiée par un membre éminent des Volcom Image 9 : Photo de Condé et Calik, publiée par un membre éminent des Volcom.

En outre, les membres des Volcom rapportent certaines réunions au sommet entre les dirigeants d’Albayrak et l’administration Condé, comme l’illustre cette photo de Condé en discussion avec Ahmet Calik le 30 octobre 2019, postée par Ibrahima Kallo sur Twitter (Image 9). Dans la publication sont identifiés deux ministres du gouvernement Condé, deux membres de Volcom, et le président-directeur général du Fonds d’Entretien Routier. Cette même année, Albayrak a remporté un contrat pour prolonger un segment de route vers le Port Autonome de Conakry.

L'avion privé de Condé (numéro de série TC-VTN), prêté par Erdogan. Image 10 : L'avion privé de Condé (numéro de série TC-VTN), un prêt d'Erdogan.

Les présidents Erdogan et Condé ont également de très bonnes relations personnelles. Erdogan fut l’un des rares dirigeants internationaux à exprimer son soutien à Condé en envoyant des félicitations officielles après le référendum de mars 2010. Erdogan a également prêté un avion privé à Condé, que Condé utilise à présent comme son avion officiel (Image 11). Un suivi de l’activité récente de l’avion révèle au moins quatre aller-retours entre la Guinée et la Turquie dans la seule seconde moitié de 2019.

Cependant, quoique quelques indices semblent désigner un lien entre les contenus des Volcom et les intérêts officiels de la Turquie, nous n’avons pas pu déterminer l’identité de l’administrateur turc des Pages des Volcom, ni trouver des preuves directes d’une implication turque dans ce réseau.

L'influence des Volcom sur la politique guinéenne

Nous avons contacté plusieurs journalistes et guinéens politiquement engagés pour comprendre dans quelle mesure les Pages des Volcom influencent la politique guinéenne, et combien il était plausible qu’elles convainquent les électeurs à l’orée de l’élection présidentielle d’octobre, ou d’exacerber les tensions entre groupes ethniques en Guinée. De nombreuses sources guinéennes ont confirmé que Volcom est financé par le parti du président et que les principaux partis d’opposition en Guinée utilisent aussi des réseaux sociaux et diffusent de la désinformation ou de la mésinformation. Par exemple, d’après certaines de nos sources, l’opposition aurait prétendu qu’Alpha Condé était traité pour le Covid-19 à l’étranger, ce qui s’est avéré faux. Cependant, bien que nous ayons trouvé des Pages soutenant l’opposition guinéenne avec des dizaines ou des centaines d’abonnés, aucune ne présentait un système de publication coordonné. Nos sources affirment que la désinformation en ligne (aussi appelée « intoxication » en Guinée) est un élément si crucial du jeu politique qu’aucun parti ne peut se permettre de s’en abstraire.

La propagande politique et la désinformation en Guinée sont loin d’être inoffensives. Nos sources ont déploré l’illettrisme digital en Guinée, qui rend la population très susceptible à la propagande sur internet. « C’est un immense problème en Guinée. Tout ce que les gens voient sur Facebook, ils s’imaginent que c’est la réalité. Il y a aussi beaucoup plus de fausses informations et de fausses actualités en Guinée. » Plusieurs de nos contacts ont exprimé la crainte qu’en nourrissant l’antagonisme entre partis, la désinformation n’accentue les tensions entre les groupes ethniques Peuls et Mandinka. Une série d’articles de presse sur les Volcom se focalise sur une affaire de 2018, dans laquelle des communicants du RPG et de l’UFDG ont été arrêtés pour incitation à la violence.

Que faire pour limiter la propagande digitale en Guinée ?

Nos contacts en Guinée sont sceptiques quant à l’efficacité d’une nouvelle régulation contre la désinformation. Comme une personne l’a évoqué, «Notre Constitution mentionne la cybercriminalité et prévoit des sanctions ; mais la mise en application, comme dans tous les domaines, pêche. » Ils ont souvent cité le besoin d’impliquer plus activement la société civile : « Il nous faut une société civile très dynamique et ouverte. Si aucun organisme indépendant ne contrôle l’action gouvernementale, la société civile doit garantir la transparence. » D’autres ont mis en exergue l’importance de formations en communication digitale pour le public.

Cependant, la construction d’une société civile robuste, ou l’amélioration de l’éducation en matière digitale, prendront du temps. Alors que la Guinée se prépare pour une élection décisive, le parti au pouvoir a déjà construit l’infrastructure Facebook nécessaire pour mener des campagnes de propagande grande ampleur en faveur d’un troisième mandat du Président Condé. Nous voyons cette opération comme un cas d’espèce d’une campagne politique qui – intentionnellement ou non – met au jour des zones grises dans les politiques de Facebook. Facebook juge que ce réseau ne remplit pas les critères d’une « action inauthentique concertée », mais nous croyons que le manque de transparence du réseau sur ses affiliations avec le parti au pouvoir est incompatible avec l’idéal démocratique d’une campagne électorale. 

All News button
1
Subtitle

Nous avons enquêté sur un large réseau de pages Facebook opérées par le parti du président guinéen Alpha Condé. Les Pages orchestrent des publications qui soutiennent la candidature de Condé à un troisième mandat, et sont gérées sous des noms d'emprunt.

-

This event is co-sponsored with the Cyber Policy Center and the Center for a New American Security.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/KaydMdIVtGc

 

About the Event: The United States is steadily losing ground in the race against China to pioneer the most important technologies of the 21st century. With technology a critical determinant of future military advantage, a key driver of economic prosperity, and a potent tool for the promotion of different models of governance, the stakes could not be higher. To compete, China is leveraging its formidable scale—whether measured in terms of research and development expenditures, data sets, scientists and engineers, venture capital, or the reach of its leading technology companies. The only way for the United States to tip the scale back in its favor is to deepen cooperation with allies. The global diffusion of innovation also places a premium on aligning U.S. and ally efforts to protect technology. Unless coordinated with allies, tougher U.S. investment screening and export control policies will feature major seams that Beijing can exploit.

On early June, join Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) for a unique virtual event that will feature three policy experts advancing concrete ideas for how the United States can enhance cooperation with allies around technology innovation and protection.

This webinar will be on-the-record, and include time for audience Q&A.

 

About the Speakers: 

Anja Manuel, Stanford Research Affiliate, CNAS Adjunct Senior Fellow, Partner at Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC, and author with Pav Singh of Compete, Contest and Collaborate: How to Win the Technology Race with China.

 

Daniel Kliman, Senior Fellow and Director, CNAS Asia-Pacific Security Program, and co-author of a recent report, Forging an Alliance Innovation Base.

 

Martijn Rasser, Senior Fellow, CNAS Technology and National Security Program, and lead researcher on the Technology Alliance Project

Virtual Seminar

Anja Manuel, Daniel Kliman, and Martijn Rasser
Seminars
Authors
News Type
Blogs
Date
Paragraphs

As scientists continue to study how the COVID-19 pandemic took hold in Wuhan, China, and around the world, the infection’s early pathways have proven fertile ground for speculation and conspiracy theories. Although COVID-19’s earliest origins may remain uncertain, the story of one volley in the ongoing U.S.-China blame game shows that misinformation about the disease can be traced to specific speculations, distortions, and amplifications. 

A hostile messaging war between U.S. and Chinese officials seeking to deflect blame for the pandemic’s harms has included the U.S. president labeling the pandemic a “Chinese virus” to a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson spreading unfounded speculation that the U.S. military had a hand in introducing the virus to Wuhan. That speculation fed off of widely debunked theories that the virus was human-engineered and the fact that U.S. military personnel took part in the Military World Games in Wuhan in October 2019.

On March 12, Zhao Lijian, a deputy director-general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Information Department, took to Twitter with a video clip in which U.S. Centers for Disease Control chief Robert Redfield said some patients who died from COVID-19 might not have been tested. Zhao added: “It might be US army [sic] who brought the epidemic to Wuhan.”


Lijian Zhao shares a tweet alleging U.S. military involvement in introducing the virus to Wuhan.
 

A few hours later, Zhao shared an article from a conspiracy site entitled “Further Evidence that the Virus Originated in the US.”


Another Tweet by Lijian Zhao claiming to have evidence for a U.S. origin of the virus.
 

Zhao’s implication that the United States and its military could be behind Wuhan’s outbreak, even inadvertently, sparked outrage. The U.S. government summoned Cui Tiankai, the Chinese ambassador to the United States, over the remarks. Cui later publicly disavowed the U.S. military conspiracy theory, and Chinese officials have not further amplified it.

Groundless speculation about the origins of the pandemic did not begin with Zhao, but the case of his eye-catching tweets reveals how China’s changing propaganda tactics have interacted with mangled news reporting, social media conspiracy theorizing, and underlying U.S.-China tensions—all resulting in high-profile misinformation about a public health crisis. 

An examination of social media posts across Weibo, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, and Reddit in English, Chinese, and Japanese reveals the context and pathways that brought this particular conspiracy theory to Chinese state media and diplomatic channels. Weeks of speculation and online conspiracy theorizing about military links to the virus’ origins or emergence, combined with a broadening uncertainty about the circumstances of Wuhan’s outbreak and increasingly brittle U.S.-China rhetoric, laid the groundwork for Zhao’s inflammatory tweets and the reaction that followed.

Theories Involving the U.S. Military Circulated on Social Media as Early as January

Speculation or conspiracy theory writings about a potential role for the U.S. military in Wuhan’s outbreak circulated weeks before Zhao, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, amplified the idea on Twitter.

Since several platforms have pledged to remove disinformation related to the origin of the coronavirus, and our research started in mid-March, some materials could have been removed. Still, speculation about a U.S. role can be traced at least as far back as January. Though the earliest speculation did not necessarily catch on, some early references include:

  • January 2: a Chinese-language YouTube channel had shared a video dismissing the idea that the pneumonia in Wuhan was the result of U.S. genetic warfare, which could imply at least some dissemination of the idea prior to this. 

  • January 20: a Twitter user claimed the virus was 90% similar to one that had earlier been reported to a U.S. viral gene database.

  • January 21: another Twitter account wrote plainly that the “pneumonia of unknown origin in Wuhan” was caused by a “biochemical weapon developed by the U.S. military.”

  • January 31: a video appearing to be an old TV segment on alleged U.S. biological warfare during the Korean war was shared to YouTube with a title asking, “Were SARS, MERS, and COVID-19 U.S. Plots?”

By February 1, Twitter activity included speculation that the virus was linked to U.S. attendance at the Military World Games, which took place in Wuhan in October 2019—an idea that featured in the conspiracy theory article Zhao shared almost six weeks later. One account posted messages in response to CNN and BBC reporting claiming that the virus emerged near the hotel where U.S. participants stayed.


A Tweet posted verbatim several times suggesting a link between the Wuhan Military World Games, the U.S. military, and the coronavirus outbreak; here in a reply to a Tweet by CNN
 

The earliest instance of allegations of U.S. involvement that we found on Facebook was a Chinese-language post on February 6 linking to a now-removed YouTube video with the title, “The United States Made the Wuhan Virus 5 Years Ago? Causes Human Infection With Infectious Pneumonia. Situation Out of Control.” The YouTube channel behind the removed video, however, is still active and has posted another video on the conspiracy theory to its 246,000 followers. 


A post on 新聞世界 (“News World”) alleges U.S. involvement in the COVID-19 outbreak and links to a video titled “美国5年前制造了武汉病毒?可致人感染传染性肺炎。局面失控。” (“The United States Made the Wuhan Virus 5 Years Ago? Causes Human Infection With Infectious Pneumonia. Situation Out of Control.”)
 

On February 21st, a now-deleted Japanese TV report suggested that COVID-19 had been active in the United States in 2019. This report was shared in various posts on Facebook and Chinese social media, which used the report as evidence to speculate that U.S. military participants in the Military World Games might have carried the virus with them.


A Facebook page sharing Chinese social media posts and an image from a Japanese TV report that had suggested COVID-19 was active in the United States in 2019. The post raises conspiracy theories.
 

From Unknown Animal Origin to Unknown Geographical Origin

Chinese state media has carried a variety of narratives about the pandemic over time, and indeed it has carried competing theories as expressed by different sources. In general, however, over the period from January leading up to the attention-getting Foreign Ministry tweets in March, reporting shifted from suspicions of animal origin to questions about whether the virus could have been carried to Wuhan by humans from another location.

  • January 29: The foreign-facing state broadcaster CGTN noted that although “the exact origins of this virus are still unknown, medical researchers believe it originated from an animal.”

  • February 10: CGTN shared a video on its Facebook page labeled “Facts Tell” and dismissing “bogus claims” in coronavirus-related conspiracy theories. It stated that the coronavirus is not man-made and argued against a Washington Times article speculating that the virus might have escaped from a Wuhan laboratory.


Chinese broadcaster CGTN’s February 10 video states that the novel coronavirus is not man-made
 

  • February 22: The Global Times — a provocative and often nationalistic tabloid published by the Communist Party mouthpiece People’s Daily — cast doubt on the geographic origin of the virus, citing a Chinese study claiming that the coronavirus did not originate in the Huanan Seafood market as originally believed. 

  • February 23: A Global Times article published by People’s Daily Online referenced the now-deleted Japanese TV report speculating that COVID-19 might have been active and misidentified as influenza in the United States in 2019. The article quoted social media speculation that U.S. participants in the Military World Games in October might have carried the virus to Wuhan

  • February 27: The prominent Chinese doctor Zhong Nanshan remarked at a press conference that the geographic origin of the virus was still unknown and that it could have come from outside of China. His comments were carried widely, including by CGTN.

  • In Facebook posts on March 5 and March 6, the official Chinese newswire Xinhua proclaimed the origin of the virus “undetermined” and suggested it may have originated outside China

  • March 11: The People’s Daily on Facebook mentioned the Huanan Seafood Market as the “potential origin” of the virus.

Over a period of six weeks, official Chinese media references broadened uncertainty about COVID-19’s origins from an unknown animal to an unknown place.

Under Pressure, China’s Foreign Ministry Sows Doubt About the Outbreak’s Origins

By March 4, uncertainty about the geographic origin of the virus had made it to the Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s podium, where Zhao Lijian argued against the idea that the pandemic was a “China virus” and referenced Zhong Nanshan in saying that the outbreak first appeared in China but it may not originate there. The Chinese Embassy in South Africa amplified that point on Twitter on March 8. 

Zhao was not only expressing uncertainty about origins; he was pushing back against persistent efforts to label SARS-CoV-2 a “Chinese virus” weeks after the World Health Organization had designated the disease “COVID-19” in part to avoid stigma related to geographically-linked names like “Wuhan Coronavirus.”

The criticism aimed at China’s government over its handling of the outbreak had been wide-ranging, and U.S. officials had also engaged in some conspiracy theorizing of their own. Senator Tom Cotton, for instance, had advanced a number of unfounded or speculative theories about the virus’ origin in late January and February. A conspiracy theorist talk radio website had also claimed “proof” that the virus was a Chinese military bioweapon in an article rated “false” by Politifact. 

By the time Zhao was pushing the U.S. military import theory and his Foreign Ministry colleagues were questioning whether the virus came from China at all, therefore, the U.S.–China blame game dynamic over the virus had already incorporated unsupported theories.

Still, Zhao’s March 12 speculation on Twitter that “It might be US army [sic] who brought the epidemic to Wuhan” drew widespread public attention, as Chinese government spokespeople had long made even their more inflammatory claims from the podium, as opposed to on Twitter. 

Zhao’s tweet was in part based on testimony by U.S. CDC Director Robert Redfield that it was possible some U.S. deaths assumed to be caused by influenza were actually COVID-19 cases—a message Zhao’s boss Hua Chunying, the ministry’s top spokesperson, also leveraged to argue “It is absolutely WRONG and INAPPROPRIATE to call this the Chinese coronavirus.”

This louder, more assertive online behavior from Chinese diplomats could well be the new normal. Reuters reported that Chinese leader Xi Jinping issued handwritten instructions last year to show a “fighting spirit.”

False Narratives on COVID-19’s Origins Remain Widespread

Ultimately, Zhao’s attention-grabbing tweets and statements from the Foreign Ministry podium may or may not set the tone for future Chinese government messaging. The international reaction, and Chinese Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai’s repudiation of the most blatant misinformation, may have changed the landscape for now.

Outside the halls of officialdom, however, social media remains a fertile and shifting ground for speculation and conspiracy theories. When searching for “新冠病毒” (“novel coronavirus”) on YouTube on March 22, 2020, the second autocomplete search suggestion was “The novel coronavirus is an American genetic weapon” (““新冠病毒是美国基因武器”). Trying the term again today, on March 31, however only yields the top result from the March 22 search Li Yongle, a popular YouTube channel various educational videos on various topics. This suggests Google-owned YouTube is still, as promised, taking measures to restrict disinformation related to the origin of COVID-19.


Screenshot from March 22, 2020:  “The novel coronavirus is an American genetic weapon” (““新冠病毒是美国基因武器”) is now the second autocomplete suggestion in YouTube if one searches for “novel coronavirus” in Chinese (“新冠病毒”). Suggestions have since been restricted.
 

On Chinese video sharing platform Watermelon Video (西瓜视频), the first suggestion when searching for “U.S. Army” (“美军“) on March 23 was “What did the U.S. Army do in Wuhan” (“美军到武汉干什么”). Today it is the fourth suggestion.


Screenshot from March 23, 2020: On Chinese video sharing platform Watermelon Video (西瓜视频), the first suggestion when searching for “U.S. Army” (“美军“) is “What did the U.S. Army do in Wuhan” (“美军到武汉干什么”). Today (March 31) it comes fourth.
 

In times of uncertainty, speculation, and political blame games, continued vigilance is key when it comes to assessing and sharing information—even, or sometimes especially, when it comes from state channels. Social media companies need to maintain their efforts to proactively remove unfounded speculation and disinformation on their own platforms, regardless of who posts it. Citizens and journalists should question the intentions an actor promoting online content may have before possibly amplifying misleading voices. The COVID-19 pandemic makes careful handling of information and fact-based decision-making even more crucial than usual.

All News button
1
Authors
Stanford Internet Observatory
News Type
Blogs
Date
Paragraphs

An expanded version of this article was published on June 8, 2020 in the Harvard Misinformation Review.

The perception of China’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic has been a significant challenge for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the past two months. The CCP has been attempting to control the narrative and deflect blame since the start of the outbreak, both domestically and abroad. It has done this by drawing on its substantial state- and CCP-owned media apparatus.  

Chinese state media produces and disseminates daily English-language content to English-speaking audiences via Facebook and Twitter (platforms that are technically banned in China). Chinese state media’s English-language Facebook pages post very frequently, and have extremely large audiences. CGTN has over 96 million Page likes; CNN in contrast has only 32 million. These media properties run ads regularly to grow their audiences, which suggests that China invests in these pages as a tool for communicating its message to the English-speaking world. Facebook’s Ads Library shows specific regional ad targeting in India (Punjab State), Nepal, Bangladesh (Dhaka) and the Philippines (Manila), suggesting that English is used to communicate state views to a broad global audience.

To look at how coronavirus narratives targeting English-speaking audiences have played out on Chinese state media, and how they evolved as the outbreak has moved through various phases, we analyzed a data set of Facebook posts containing the keyword “coronavirus” from two distinct sets of media properties: 1) a collection of English-language Chinese (state) media outlets, and 2) a collection of U.S. media outlets*. This “coronavirus” dataset contained 6,870 posts from Chinese media between December 31, 2019 and March 16, 2020, and 13,522 posts from U.S. media outlets over the same period. While Chinese media has increased its coronavirus coverage in January and stayed at a consistent level since then, U.S. media Facebook posts on the coronavirus stayed at low levels until late February, then soared (see histograms below).

 

 
Chinese outlets (left) increase the number of Facebook posts on coronavirus in late January. U.S. media coverage was light until a sudden increase of posts since late February.

China’s media spin: rapid recovery 

Chinese and U.S. media articles display different levels of both alarmism and optimism in their coverage of the global pandemic. Chinese outlets included many articles with a focus on positive stories such as the number of recovered patients and examples of successful treatments, while U.S. media reported on new cases of infections and trends in death. For example, Chinese state media reported on a coronavirus patient who gave birth to a healthy baby not infected with coronavirus, whereas the U.S. media told the story of a different newborn in Wuhan who had become the youngest coronavirus patient. CNN credited the story’s source as Chinese state media CCTV, yet no English-language Chinese state media posted this story on their Facebook pages. 


Chinese state outlet China Daily (left) reports on a baby born to a coronavirus patient with no infection, whereas CNN (right) reports on a newborn baby becoming the youngest person diagnosed with coronavirus

We searched our dataset for the word “patient” and analyzed words commonly used before or after “patient” in Facebook posts made by Chinese state media and U.S. mainstream media. From December 31, 2019 to March 16, 2020, the term “infected” was commonly used in connection with “patient” in both the American and Chinese media (see word clouds below). However, beyond that common term, there are significant divergences, such as the U.S. media reporting on patients as “sick” or “affected”, and the Chinese media frequently mentioning treatment- and recovery-related terms such as “treating”, “recovered”, “discharged” and “cured”.


Words frequently used in connection with the word “patient” by Chinese media (left) and U.S. media (right); Exclude “patient” and the term “coronavirus” for better visibility of other terms. Chinese media use several recovery- and treatment-related terms.

The English-language Chinese state media has also aggressively reported positive stories about the make-shift hospitals built for China’s immediate emergency response to the coronavirus outbreak. Leishenshan and Huoshenshan hospitals were built in just a few days in late January to early February. Chinese state media disseminated stories about how the international community was “impressed” with China’s rapid building capacity, calling the quick progress of the construction a “miracle.” U.S. media also reported on the rapid building of the hospitals but presented them in a less positive light, saying they were a response to overwhelmed medical facilities or that the temporary structures should not be characterized as hospitals. 

 
Chinese state outlet CGTN (left) calls the hospital a “construction miracle”, whereas NPR (right) reports on the building, but qualifies it that the term “hospital” for the building ”may not be exactly on point”

The Li Wenliang Case

A significant story that played out as the coronavirus outbreak unfolded was that of late whistleblower doctor Li Wenliang, who was one of the first to report the existence of the novel disease warning fellow medics in a chat group on December 30, 2019. His warnings were shared publicly and reached a wide audience online. On January 3, 2020 police detained and forced him to sign a letter stating he had made “false comments.” In a late January post on Chinese social media Weibo, Li reported from his hospital bed that he was in an intensive care unit with breathing difficulty. Li Wenliang died of COVID-19 on February 7, 2020 at age 34. The significant public anger that erupted over his death created a very dangerous moment for the Chinese regime, and required Chinese media to delicately balance covering his story without casting the Chinese government in a bad light.

In our dataset, there are 24 posts by Chinese media and 24 posts by U.S. media containing “Li Wenliang”. The word clouds below represent the 50 most common words used in these articles after filtering out common words such as “the” and excluding the terms “coronavirus”, “li”, and “wenliang”. While in U.S. media, prominent terms associated with Li Wenliang include “silenced”, and “authorities”, these terms are notably absent in Chinese media. Chinese media instead focus on him being an “ophthalmologist” and expressing “condolences”.

Image
  
Words frequently used in Facebook posts mentioning Li Wenliang by Chinese media (left) and U.S. media (right); Exclude Li Wenliang’s name and the term “coronavirus” for better visibility of other terms

Individual popular Facebook posts illustrate this contrast: The Facebook post with the highest engagement (49,093 Reactions, 2,242 times shared) posted by Chinese state media in English state they “deeply mourn” his death and that he passed away after “all-effort rescue.” There is no mention of the whistleblower controversy and the restrictions placed on him early in the outbreak.


Chinese state media outlet People’s Daily (left) post on Li Wenliang “mourning” his death, without mentioning his whistleblowing and repression faced by authorities; Most popular post in U.S. media on Li Wenliang (right) mentions he was “threatened” by Chinese officials

In contrast, the most popular social media posting on Li Wenliang in the U.S. media (27,263 Reactions, 43,190 times shared) mentions that he was “threatened” and that he had “sounded the alarm” on coronavirus. Other articles and posts in U.S. media link Li Wenliang’s case to censorship and suppression in China, mentioning how Chinese netizens have demanded freedom of speech since the details of Wenliang’s story were brought to light.


A popular NPR post links Li Wenliang’s name to censorship in China

‘Buying the world time’ vs. ‘Botching the response’

Early in the global outbreak, Chinese outlets declared a local victory over the virus, stating that China’s efforts had prevented coronavirus from infecting the world, boasting: “Were it not for the unique institutional advantages of the Chinese system, the world might be battling a devastating pandemic.”  As global coronavirus infections near two hundred thousand, and cases of infection and deaths outside China surpass those within, this narrative has become less defensible.

 China has responded by increasing its efforts to position itself as a world leader in virus response and a model of effective governance whilst blaming the United States for the coronavirus pandemic. While U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien has stated that China’s silencing of whistleblowers and covering up early cases in fact exacerbated the global outbreak, Chinese state media has disseminated a statement by Bruce Aylward, Assistant Director-General of the WHO who visited China on a WHO-mission, saying that China’s response “bought the world time” and that the global community should be “grateful.”


Chinese state media (here: Xinhua) widely shared a statement by Bruce Aylward of the Chinese WHO office saying that China’s response had bought the world time 

The narrative of China’s strategy ‘buying the world time’ has been covered and discussed in U.S. media as well, after World Health Organization Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus also stated that China's response had bought the world time. MSNBC included the phrase in a Facebook post from March 13, 2020, which went on to discuss whether U.S. leadership had in fact missed the opportunity to take advantage of that time. The New York Times also referenced the phrase in the headline of a nuanced article on the same day, which similarly wondered why the rest of the world had simply watched the epidemic unfold. 


U.S. media outlet MSNBC discussing the comparative response of China and the U.S., including the narrative that “China has bought the world time”

Looking Forward

Chinese state media is not unique in evolving its narratives, or in spreading misinformation or omitting facts to cast itself in the best light possible for a global audience. In the U.S. media environment, the Fox News network has also dramatically shifted their coverage of the coronavirus disease in response to political considerations, adjusting their coverage to make the U.S. executive branch leadership look like leaders. This tone change was so brazen that the Washington Post labeled it “a petri dish for misinformation.” While we did not include far left or far right U.S. media sources in our data set for the above analysis, other US news outlets also downplayed the threat.

In the latest activity from the U.S. media, there is now a dichotomy in coverage: many conservative outlets are accusing the Chinese government of causing a global pandemic due to the significant missteps in their early response, and deflecting blame from the Trump Administration's own failures. The other side is reporting on the problematic response in the United States, while highlighting later successful Chinese containment efforts.

The blame game will not be helpful. It is both true that the Chinese government made strikingly bad decisions in its early response to the virus - and also that the United States will suffer from its own lack of preparation. Meanwhile, amid the bungled U.S. COVID-19 response - including a lack of coordination even with close allies - the Chinese government is supporting hard-hit countries by sending supplies and medical experts, garnering praise from around the world. As Western democracies struggle to land on effective COVID-19 responses, experts expect a more aggressive narrative to come from Beijing.

 

* Chinese media: CGTN; People’s Daily, China; China Xinhua News; China Daily; Global Times; CGTN America
U.S. media: ABC News; ABC World News Tonight with David Muir; AP; CBS News; CNBC; CNN; CNN Politics; Fox News; Los Angeles Times, MSNBC, NBC News, NPR; NPR Politics; POLITICO; Reuters; The Atlantic; The New York Times; The Wall Street Journal; TIME; Washington Post

All News button
1
Paragraphs

DOWNLOAD WHITE PAPER

Upon request by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), researchers reviewed a data set of social media posts that Facebook provided to SSCI. Facebook attributed the material to the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Главное управление Генерального штаба Вооружённых сил Российской Федерации), known as the GU, or by its prior abbreviation GRU, which we will use throughout this document. The data set was provided to SSCI in response to a Committee inquiry about GRU activities on Facebook.

Facebook attributed this collection of 28 folders of data, each consisting of the contents of at least one unique Facebook Page, to the GRU. This report quantifies and contextualizes the material in that data set. It includes a background overview of GRU tactics and methods, a collection of summary statistics, and a set of key takeaways about several distinct operational clusters that are then discussed in detail later in the document. These clusters include the creation of fake personas, publications, and organizations to aid in the dissemination of Russian government narratives; operations targeting Ukraine; operations targeting the United States; and hack-and-leak operations.

The Pages in this data set were taken down in accordance with Facebook’s policy on inauthentic activity and are no longer visible to the public. While some content related to these operations has been unearthed by investigative journalists, a substantial amount has not been seen by the public in the context of GRU attribution. Much of it, as we will discuss, has ties to material that remains accessible elsewhere on the broader internet. We have attempted to aggregate and archive that broader expanse of data for public viewing and in service to further academic research.

This publication and its conclusions are in part based on the analysis of social media content that was provided to the authors by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under the auspices of the Committee’s Technical Advisory Group, whose Members serve to provide substantive technical and expert advice on topics of importance to ongoing Committee activity and oversight. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented herein are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence or its Membership.

 

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
White Papers
Publication Date
Authors
Renee DiResta
Shelby Grossman
Subscribe to United States