The Program on Democracy and the Internet runs the work of the Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age which will produce guidelines to support democracies, particularly those of the global south. 

In the span of just two years, the widely shared utopian vision of the internet’s impact on governance has turned decidedly pessimistic.  The original promise of digital technologies was unapologetically democratic: empowering the voiceless, breaking down borders to build cross-national communities, and eliminating elite referees who restricted political discourse. 

That promise has been undercut by concern that the most democratic features of the internet are, in fact, endangering democracy itself.  Democracies pay a price for internet freedom, under this view, in the form of disinformation, hate speech, incitement, and foreign interference in elections.  They also become captive to the economic power of certain platforms, with all the accompanying challenges to privacy and speech regulation that these new, powerful information monopolies have posed.

As it forges ahead in its mandate, the Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age must consider these many challenges, as well as the opportunities they present. Professor Nathaniel Persily, a member of the Kofi Annan Commission, he has produced a framing paper for its work, available for download.

In these early days of the regulatory renaissance for digital technologies, China, Europe, and the United States are competing over whose image will be most reflected in market-defining rules and norms. Despite new lows in the trans-Atlantic relationship in the era of Trump, Europe and the United States still have far more in common with each other about how technology should be developed, deployed, and regulated than they do with China.

The fruits of a long anticipated technology finally hit the market, with promise to extend human life, revolutionize production, improve consumer welfare, reduce poverty, and inspire countless yet-imagined innovations. A marvel of science and engineering, it reflects the cumulative efforts of a generation of researchers backed by research funding from the U.S. government and private sector investments in (predominantly American) technology companies. 

Popular culture has contemplated societies of thinking machines for generations, envisioning futures from utopian to dystopian. These futures are, arguably, here now-we find ourselves at the doorstep of technology that can at least simulate the appearance of thinking, acting, and feeling. The real question is: now what?

Our national discussions about cybersecurity and privacy follow a frustrating pattern: a headline-grabbing incident like the recent Capital One breach occurs, Congress wrings its hands and policymakers more or less move on. So it is no surprise cybersecurity hasn't been much of a focus as the race to the 2020 presidential election heats up.

The issue is here to stay, and it should be debated by the candidates. Here are some concrete ideas that would significantly improve the safety and security of the nation — but require presidential leadership if they are to come to fruition.

The current regulatory and legislative infrastructure is poorly suited to address the new challenges to U.S. leadership and innovation in key technology sectors. This paper uses the semiconductor industry as a case study to advance a proposal for a strategic approach to technology policy capable of enabling long-term leadership. This proposal, rooted in structural changes to the federal technology policymaking process, would allow the United States to respond more effectively to strategic technology policymaking of China and other rising economic competitors. Initial steps to advance strategic technology policy should aim to revitalize targeted scientific research, grow the science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) talent development pipeline, and expand highly skilled immigration.

Bios: Anja Manuel, Pavneet Singh, Thompson Paine

China systematically extracts advanced technology from the West. It does so legally, by mining open source databases, investing in our most advanced companies, and compelling technology transfer as a condition for doing business in China, as well as illicitly, through cybertheft and industrial espionage.

How we choose to react will define whether the United States continues to lead in—and reap the benefits of—technical innovation and whether we will be able to set the global norms and standards for technology development and use. Previous U.S. presidents of both parties engaged China in dialogue on IP theft and market access for U.S. firms, among other issues. They were unable to correct China’s behavior. So far, the Trump Administration has focused on trade negotiations and on “defensive” measures: from Congress reforming CFIUS in 2018 and a proposed tightening of export controls, to scrutinizing and slowing cross-border collaboration, and discussing restricting Chinese student visas to the United States. i Yet instead of closing the U.S. system, as we are beginning to do, we can and must compete with China, and in some cases, find ways to collaborate.